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Abstract 
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
(CISG) is the first sales law treaty to win acceptance on a worldwide scale.  In fact, 
with its current 84 contracting States, all major industrial nations among them (except 
the United Kingdom), the CISG applies to more than two-thirds of all world trade and 
the official CISG case law database includes more than 3,000 cases. 
This paper deals with one of the most important provisions under the CISG: The 
recovery of damages after breach of contract, dealt with in art 74. The uniform 
interpretation and application of this rather short and easy sounding provision is 
subject to continuous debate among scholars and due to its practical relevance is a 
challenging task for judges. 
This paper examines three specific issues. Firstly, in light of current trends in national 
jurisdictions, this paper will discuss whether the CISG is able to and ought to provide 
for damages consisting of the profit the other party made as a result of the breach 
(disgorgement of profit). The second issue is the question whether art 74 can be 
interpreted to include the recovery of attorneys’ fees occurred during litigation. Lastly 
this paper addresses the contentious question whether agreed sums payable upon 
breach – in Common Law countries referred to as penalty clauses or liquidated 
damages clauses – can be dealt within the uniform rules of the CISG.  
 
Word length 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes and 
bibliography) comprises exactly 15151 words. 
 
 
Subjects and Topics 
 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
(CISG) 
Disgorgement of profit 
Penalty clauses 
Attorneys’ fees 
Legal costs  
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I Introduction 
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
(CISG)1 is said to be “the most significant piece of substantive contract legislation in 
effect at the international level”.2 In fact, since the adoption of the Convention in 
1980 84 States have acceded to the CISG, including all major industrial nations 
(except the United Kingdom).3 The success of the CISG shows that the international 
trade and commerce considers the CISG to be a modern legal instrument that provides 
a uniform set of rules for cross border sales contracts and therefore meets their 
practical needs in times of economic globalisation. The CISG has made international 
trade easier and more efficient by reducing transaction costs and has enhanced legal 
certainty for businesses in case of a dispute.  
However, the CISG reflects a carefully drafted compromise between different legal 
systems, which was never intended to be a comprehensive piece of law. Hence, the 
basic principles may be clear but the details can be controversial.  
 
This paper deals with the provision for damages after the breach of contract in art 74. 
Indeed, among the provisions of the CISG the articles on damages are the most 
litigated and written about.4 This is the result of the rather general wording of the 
provision, which does not provide many guidelines. Hence, art 74 confronts courts 
and scholars with particular challenges to a uniform and autonomous interpretation 
devoid of domestic perceptions, when particular heads of damages are concerned. 
Furthermore the CISG, just as any other (national) law, needs to cope with new 
developments and challenges that arise in international trade and try to find answers.  
 
This paper addresses three controversial issues concerning the interpretation of art 74 
CISG and points out opportunities but also the limits the CISG faces.  
As an introduction this paper gives a brief overview of the basic principles of art 74 
and its current interpretation (II). The following part of this paper (III) starts with a 
  
1  United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 1498 UNTS 3 (adopted 
11 April 1980, entered into force 1 January 1988). 
2  Joseph Lookofsky “The 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts or the International Sales of 
Goods” in Blanpain (ed) International Encyclopaedia of Laws: Contracts (Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, 2000). 
3   A list of all 84 contracting States is available at <www.cisg.law.pace.edu>.  
4   See generally Bruno Zeller Damages under the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale 
of Goods (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, New York, 2009); and Djakhongir Saidov The Law of 
Damages in International Sales: The CISG and other international Instruments (Oxford and 
Portland (Hart Publishing, Oregon, 2008); and John Y. Gotanda “Awarding Damages Under the 
United Nations Convention on the International Sales of Goods: A Matter of Interpretation” (2005) 
37 Geo J Int L 95. 
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case example that reveals the current question regarding disgorgement of profit in 
contract law. This paper argues that the CISG should shift to a broader conception of 
compensation and provide for disgorgement of profit as an ultima ratio remedy (III 
B). This finding is based on an analysis of the general aim of remedies under the 
CISG and a further analysis of the general principles that call for a uniform evolution 
towards the availability of disgorgement of profit. Ultimately the chapter closes with 
the outline of relevant factors when disgorgement of profit should be awarded (III C). 
The second still unresolved issue under art 74 is the recovery of attorneys’ fees 
occurred in connection with litigation after a breach of contract (IV). This paper 
concludes that these costs are a matter outside of the scope of the CISG. An 
interpretation of art 74 with regard to the serious interference with the equity of the 
parties in their procedural relationship reveals that it was not the purpose of the 
drafters to include this kind of financial expenses in substantive contract law.  
Ultimately this paper addresses the important question of agreed sums payable upon 
breach (V) which in Common Law countries are often referred to as either penalty 
clauses or liquidated damages clauses. Against the traditional approach that such 
contractual stipulations are a matter excluded from the CISG, this paper supports the 
view that the CISG governs agreed sums in their entirety, thereby preventing a 
recourse to national law. 
 
II Article 74 in a Nutshell 
This first part of the paper aims to give a brief overview of the position of article 74 in 
the CISG and its general principles. Art 74 is the general rule for the calculation of 
damages upon breach of contract and provides as follows: 
 
Damages for breach of contract by one party consist of a sum equal to the loss, 
including loss of profit, suffered by the other party as a consequence of the 
breach. Such damages may not exceed the loss which the party in breach 
foresaw or ought to have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the contract, 
in the light of the facts and matters of which he then knew or ought to have 
known, as a possible consequence of the breach of contract.  
 
Art 74 only deals with the scope of damages, whereas the right to claim damages can 
be found in art 45(1)b for the buyer and art 61(1)b for the seller. Both provisions 
stipulate a strict liability for the party in breach because they do not require any fault 
of the party in breach. In the remedial system of the CISG the right to claim damages 
sits within two other remedies. The CISG recognizes for both parties the right to 
claim specific performance and the right to avoid the contract.  
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Art 45(2) and 61(2) clarify that the aggrieved party may combine the claim for 
damages with the aforementioned remedies. Therefore art 74 has a key position 
within the CISG´s remedial matrix, as Honnold states it is “brief but powerful”.5 
 
The first sentence of art 74 shows two things: Firstly, the award of damages is always 
a monetary award (“sum equal to”). Secondly, the aim is to compensate the aggrieved 
party for any loss, including loss of profit, suffered because of the breach. The 
underlining principle of art 74 is called the “full compensation” principle.6 This 
principle is not new, in fact it is the notion of the law of damages in numerous legal 
systems and was found as a common core of damages law when the CISG was 
drafted.7  Its aim is “to place the injured party in the same economic position in which 
it would have been had the contract been performed”.8  
 
Imagine buyer B contracted for the delivery of 100 smartphones with seller S. S does 
not deliver on time. B has to undertake a cover purchase which is 500 NZD higher 
than the original price. Furthermore, B is not able to deliver to sub-buyers.  
 
In this case, B can claim damages in the amount of 500 NZD plus his lost profit, 
because this is the economic position he would have been in, if S had performed duly. 
This amount could be seen as the monetary substitute for the performance he expected 
and therefore it protects the so called “expectation interest” of the aggrieved party, a 
term used in many national legal systems. 
 
The drafters of the CISG deliberately did not determine what constitutes a loss nor did 
they include any categories of losses in the CISG, except the express naming of loss 
of profit. This reference serves merely as clarification, because some legal systems do 
not recognise a loss of profit under their national concept of loss.9 According to the 
  
5   John O. Honnold Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 United Nations Convention 
(3rd ed, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1999) at 403. 
6   Ingeborg Schwenzer  “Art 74” in Ingeborg Schwenzer (ed) Commentary on the UN Convention on 
the International Sales of Goods (CISG) (3rd ed, Oxford 2010) at [5]; CISG Advisory Council 
“Opinion No. 6: Calculation of Damages under CISG Article 74” <www.cisg.law.pace.edu> at 1. 
7   Schwenzer, above n 6, at [2]; and Djakhongir Saidov “Methods of Limiting Damages under the 
Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods” (2002) 14 Pace Intl L Rev 
307 at 310. 
8   Art 70 of the UNCITRAL Secretary General “Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods” Doc A/CONF. 97/5 reprinted in John O Honnold Documentary 
History of the Uniform Law of International Sales (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publisher, Deventer, 
1989) at 448. [Secretariat Commentary on the 1978 Draft]. The Secretariat Commentary is the 
closest counterpart to an official commentary on the CISG; it is based on the 1978 Draft of the 
CISG. Art 70 of the 1978 Draft and Art 74 CISG are substantively identical.  
9  Secretariat Commentary on the 1978 Draft, above n 8, art 70 at [3]. 
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Secretary Commentary on the 1978 Draft the courts and tribunals must “calculate that 
loss in a manner which is best suited to the circumstances.10 The provision must be 
understood in a broad manner. Every calculation is possible as long as it fits within 
the overall objective of the CISG to place the aggrieved party in the same position she 
would have enjoyed ´but for’ the breach.11 This is why recoverable losses under the 
principle of full compensation may also include losses that go beyond the lost value of 
the promised performance and may include wasted expenses the aggrieved party 
made in reliance on the contract (reliance interest in the contract) or any consequential 
damages to the buyers property (integrity interest).12 Usually the calculation of the 
economic value of the loss follows the concrete calculation, namely looking at the 
actual economic situation of the aggrieved party. However, there are tendencies that 
an abstract calculation may be appropriate in some cases and is not expressively 
excluded under the CISG.13 
 
As extensive as art 74 seems because of its strict liability and the principle of full 
compensation, there are some limitations. The Convention itself does explicitly 
exclude losses resulting from death and personal injury in art 5. Additionally moral 
losses such as suffering and pain are not covered by the CISG.14 Furthermore the 
principle of full compensation itself limits the scope of compensation. The injured 
party shall be compensated for any disadvantage resulting from the breach, but should 
not make profit out of the breach, so that any gains resulting from the breach must be 
deducted from an award of damages.15 Nevertheless, some argue that 
overcompensation must be accepted, if – under exceptional circumstances – the 
purpose of ‘full compensation’ cannot be reached otherwise.16 The avoidance of 
overcompensation is also the reason why punitive damages may not be awarded under 
art 74.17 Furthermore, for loss to be recoverable there must be a causal link between 
breach and loss (loss “as a consequence” of the breach), however, the simple ‘but for 
rule’ is sufficient.  
The second sentence of art 74 counterbalances the strict liability with the so called 
foreseeability rule. The aggrieved party is only compensated for damages the other 
  
10  See Secretariat Commentary on the 1878 Draft, above n 8, art 70 at [4]. 
11  Saidov, above n 4, at 172. 
12  Zeller, above n 4, at 73. 
13  Schwenzer, above n 6, at [41].   
14  At 39.   
15  CISG-Advisory Council, above n 6, at [9]; John Gotanda “Art 74” in Stefan Kröll, Lukas Mistelis 
and Pilar Perales Viscasillas UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
(CISG) (Beck, Munich, 2011) at [32]. 
16  Schwenzer, above n 6, at [42].   
17  CISG-Advisory Council, above n 6, at [9]. 
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party subjectively had foreseen or – from an objective point of view – could have 
foreseen when concluding the contract.  
 
Two provisions outside from art 74 could also have influence on the scope of 
damages. Firstly, art 77 stipulates the duty of the injured party to mitigate losses. The 
underlining principle is that the law should not provide compensation for avoidable 
loss. Failure to comply with the duty to mitigate damages may reduce the award of 
recoverable damages. Secondly, art 79 frees the breaching party under very narrow 
conditions from any liability for breaching the contract. 
 
III Art 74 and its Implementation: The Issue of Ethical Standards 
As simple as art 74 seems from the wording, as difficult is its practical application. 
Zeller describes that “what art 74 suggests is a mechanical way rule to calculate 
losses”, but it does not include a definition of loss or full compensation.18 The next 
case will show that the application of art 74 is not always easy. 
 
Imagine that S manufactures smartphones. B orders 100 smartphones. There is an 
explicit contractual stipulation that S ensures humanitarian working conditions, 
especially that no child labour is part of the manufacturing process.19 Although 
otherwise agreed on, S manufactures the goods using child labour. Thereby, he saves 
half of the production costs. B resells the smartphones making the normal profit. 
However, the fact that S has used child labour is discovered after the phones have 
been resold, but does not become public. 
 
The violation of the contractual obligation is a breach of contract and leads to the 
right to claim damages.20 When measuring the loss of B, the starting point must be the 
principle that B has to be put in the same position as if the contract had been properly 
performed. 
A The Protection of the Economic Outcome – Loss as Actual Economic Loss 
From an economic point of view loss is the difference of value of the goods obtained 
compared to the goods one expected to receive under the contract. At first sight, it 
may appear that B is exactly in the same position as if the contract had been 
performed properly. The problem is that the physical features of the smartphones are 
  
18  Bruno Zeller, above n 4, at 39. 
19  Example taken and slightly changed from Ingeborg Schwenzer and Pascal Hachem “The Scope of 
the CISG Provisions on Damages” in Djakhongir Saidov and Ralph Cunnington (eds) Contract 
Damages: Domestic and International Perspectives (Hart Publishing, Portland, 2008) 91 at 94. 
20  Art 45 (1) CISG. 
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the same, irrespective of how they have been produced. From this perspective, the 
way of production has no economic value, so there would be no loss in our example. 
The claim for damages would be dismissed. However, the problem can be solved, if 
the way of manufacturing was considered to have an economic value. On a consumer 
level, the way of production can have an influence on the market value. There is no 
reason why the commercial level should differ. Hence, nowadays different markets 
exist for products produced under fair conditions and products produced under unfair 
conditions. The CISG case law shows cases where a similar approach was taken 
regarding organic production.21 Having this in mind, the negative balance on the 
balance sheet results from the difference between the market value of the goods B 
received and the market value of the goods B expected to get.22  
 
However, the economic loss could be balanced out by the fact that B resold the 
products obtaining his normal profit. With the untainted goods he would not be in a 
better economic end position than he is in right now. If one remembers the general 
aim is to avoid that the aggrieved party profits from the breach and gets more than its 
expectation interest, the question is, whether the resale’s profit must be offset against 
the loss to avoid an overcompensation of B?  The CISG Advisory Council Opinion on 
art 74 provides that any benefit received as a consequence of the breach of contract 
should ‘in principle’ be offset against the economic loss.23 However the words ‘in 
principle’ indicate that this rule can have exceptions. These exceptions derive from a 
normative view on the law of damages. This view questions if the strict application of 
a rule provides a fair solution thereby accepting the effect of overcompensation. In the 
case at hand, the resale’s profit was not a direct consequence of the breach as such, 
but from B’s normal business. It seems unfair that S benefits from that fact, 
considering that B could not detect the defect of the goods delivered.  
 
In practice, B might have difficulty proving the exact difference between the market 
value. The contract could have provided help, if the parties had expressly declared 
that B pays a certain amount over the normal purchase price for the compliance with 
human rights.24 In the provided example, however, the only certain number is the gain 
made by S, i.e. the costs saved in the production process. It then needs to be 
determined whether B can claim that the gain made by S through the breach of 
  
21  With regard to organically produced goods see OLG Munich, Urteil v. 13. November 2002 (27 U 
346/02), CISG-online 786, <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/021113g1.html>. 
22  Nils Schmidt-Ahrendt “Disgorgement of Profits under the CISG” in Ingeborg Schwenzer and Lisa 
Spangolo (eds) Sate of Play: The 3rd annual MAA Schlechtriem CISG Conference (Eleven 
International, Den Haag, 2011) 89 at 101. 
23  CISG Advisory Council, above n 6, at [9]. 
24  So the example in Schwenzer and Hachem, above n 19, at 94. 
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contract is equivalent with his loss. S probably calculated the costs for normal 
workers when naming the purchase price. So there is a presumption that this 
difference is the minimal difference of the market value of the goods in question. The 
gains made by S serve merely as a yardstick to measure the difference in economic 
value of the goods.  
 
However, this leaves the possibility for B to prove that the amount of saved 
production costs is higher than the difference in price between untainted and tainted 
goods. Schmidt-Ahrens, who discussed this possibility, argued that the seller is 
entitled to keep his profit, because there is no legal reason why the buyer should 
receive the “windfall”.25 It is at this point, where the question arises whether the 
economic view of the expectation interest in such a case is satisfying? Certainly, B 
strived for compliance with the ethical standard not only because of the higher 
economical value, but also because of his interest to guarantee compliance with 
human rights in his supply chain. He had a special interest in the performance itself, 
not only in the economic value of the products. Are there cases where the aggrieved 
party is not fully compensated, even if his economic loss is compensated? 
B Shift to a Broader Understanding of Full Compensation Principle 
The common understanding that the loss suffered by a party is the actual loss of the 
economic value expected under the contract may be challenged, if one considers that 
in the example above the plaintiff has no legal instrument to ensure that his 
contracting party does keep the contract, because the defendant has an incentive to 
breach the contract whenever his financial benefit resulting from the breach exceeds 
the economic loss to the defendant. 
  
The question is therefore, whether the CISG could and should develop the orthodox 
meaning of full compensation. Furthermore, if the law of damages and art 74 as the 
basic provision for the measurement of damages want to protect more than the 
economic outcome of the contract, how does this affect the meaning of loss and its 
calculation? 
 
An answer to these questions requires, as a first step, to analyse the underlining 
principles of the remedial system under the CISG. Only with knowing the purposes of 
the law of damages  can one decide how the CISG can react to new challenges. 
  
25  Schmidt-Ahrendt, above n 22, at 102. 
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1 The aims of damages in the four corners of the CISG 
This analysis may seem superfluous having in mind that the aim of art 74 in the first 
part of this paper was stated as the protection of the expectation interest. However, the 
expectation interest is in itself a term that is open for interpretation. It can mean the 
merely economic expectation as a result of the performance or it can mean the 
expectation of performance as such. Therefore it is worth investigating the aims of 
remedies in general from a broader perspective by looking at the interplay of different 
principles that can be found in the CISG itself. 
 
CISG is private contract law that provides default rules for international sales 
contracts. However, the basis is the existence of the contract itself which is a result of 
the parties’ own will.26 If the law does not provide means to give effect to these 
contractual obligations, the right resulting out of the contract would be a “hollow one, 
stripped of all practical force and devoid of all content”.27 So the first purpose of 
remedies can be defined as to ensure an effective operation of contract law by 
effectively protecting the contractual right to performance. An effective protection of 
the contractual right to performance creates security in commercial relationships and 
lets parties rely on their contract. If the law does not protect the contractual right to 
performance effectively parties will be reluctant to enter into contracts and the aim of 
the CISG to facilitate international trade would be ultimately undermined.28  
 
In regard to what constitutes an effective protection of the interest in performance in 
case of a failure to perform, the most rigorous answer would be a remedial right to 
require performance. Under art 46 (1) and art 62 the CISG generally acknowledges 
such a right and follows the principle of pacta sunt servanda (contracts must be 
performed). In this regard the CISG reflects the remedial system in most Civil Law 
systems. 
 
However, the existence of some exceptions and restrictions to the general right to 
compel performance shows that the question ‘what constitutes an effective protection 
of the interest in performance’ is also influenced by economic considerations and a 
fair balance of parties’ interests. Having in mind that the CISG concentrates on 
business to business relationships in international trade, it cannot be denied that the 
contracting parties want the law to provide security, but also to acknowledge that 
  
26  Named the “will theory” of contract law in L.L. Fuller and William R Perdue “The Reliance 
Interest in Contract Damages” (1936) 46 Yale LJ 52 at 58. 
27  David Pearce and Roger Halson “Damages for Breach of Contract: Compensation, Restitution and 
Vindication” (2008) 28 Oxford J of Legal Studies 73 at 73. 
28  Saidov, above n 4, at 18; and Katy Barnett Accounting for Profit for Breach of Contract: Theory 
and Practice (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2012) at 30. 
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considerations of economic efficiency form in most cases the basis of their contractual 
relationship. Just the same as too little protection can hinder parties from contracting, 
too strict legal rules do not serve the purpose of the CISG to facilitate trade. In the 
case of non-conforming goods, special restrictions on the claim to performance can be 
found in art 46 (2) and art 46 (3). Para 2 requires a fundamental breach for the 
delivery of substitutive delivery and para 3 considers whether repair as one form of 
specific performance is “reasonable having regard to all circumstances”. Both 
provisions take into consideration expenses for the party in breach compared to the 
interest of the aggrieved party.  
 
Apart from these specific provisions, even when the right to specific performance 
exists pursuant to the CISG, its enforcement may be limited pursuant to art 28. This 
provision opens the possibility for the court to refuse specific performance if it would 
not grant this remedy under its domestic law in respect of a similar contract. Art 28 is 
the result of the failure during the drafting process of the CISG to find a compromise 
between the divergent concepts on the availability of the right to require performance 
between European Civil Law systems and English and American Common Law 
systems.29 Whereas specific performance is a standard remedy in Civil Law Systems, 
Common Law systems award damages as the primary remedy and allow specific 
relief only in particular circumstances when damages are considered as 
“inadequate”.30 This development is deeply rooted in the history of these legal 
systems and influenced by economic reasons.31  
In practice the existence of art 28 may lead to a case where a plaintiff´s claim for 
specific performance is rejected and replaced by a monetary award. However, this 
possibility is not at odds with the position of the CISG that the right to performance is 
the point of reference for any remedy. 
 
  
29   For an overview of the discussion during the drafting process see documents in Honnold, above n 8, 
at 672, 741, 524–526, 647. 
30  As example see s 52 (1) of the Sales of Goods Act 1979 (UK): “In any action for breach of contract 
to deliver specific or ascertained goods the court may, if it thinks fit, on the plaintiff’s application, 
by its judgment or decree direct that the contract shall be performed specifically, without giving the 
defendant the option of retaining the goods on payment of damages” and § 2–716 (1) of the 
Uniform Commercial Code in the United States of America: “Specific performance may be decreed 
where the goods are unique or in other proper circumstances”. 
31  Historically Common Law countries such as England and Australia differentiated between 
Common Law courts which could only order the payment of money damages and courts of equity, 
controlled by the King through his Chancellor, which had the power to compel performance where 
money was not considered as effective relief. Economic reasons were the roots of the theory of 
efficient breach, referred to below in III B 2. 
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Firstly, the application of art 28 is at the discretion of the court. The court “is not 
bound to enter a judgment for specific performance”, but likewise it can do so, even if 
the national law does not provide for that.32 What the CISG pursues with art 28 is to 
create the necessary flexibility for both, common and civil law courts, to decide what 
is the best, or – considering all circumstances – the most appropriate, remedy for the 
breach of contract.  
 
Secondly, the fact that art 28 has not been the subject of many decisions in more than 
thirty years of CISG’s existence proves that the difference between the Civil Law 
approach and Common Law approach is not as significant as thought. In practice even 
the aggrieved party often prefers to claim the financial loss than to enforce specific 
performance and likewise in cases where a party seeks specific performance the 
case’s circumstances justified an award of specific performance even under common 
law.33 Imagine a case where a buyer can easily purchase replacement goods with 
money damages. He may not even want to continue his business relationship with the 
seller and also prefers to avoid risks and difficulties inherent in a claim for specific 
performance, especially its enforcement, if he considers his primary interest to obtain 
the goods is sufficiently satisfied by money.34 In this example it is the most 
appropriate, because it is the easiest and commercially efficient, remedy for all 
parties.  
 
A further means to secure an effective protection of the right to performance is the 
effect of remedies to deter parties, at least to some extent, from breaching the 
contract. An effective protection includes providing remedies that reduce the 
incentive to breach the contract as far as it’s necessary to recognise the interest the 
aggrieved party had in the contract. ‘As far as necessary’ demonstrates that different 
degrees of deterrence are possible. The most deterrent effect has the remedy to 
compel the party in breach to perform. If a party has to perform in any way, there is 
no incentive to breach the contract. However, it may be asked if strict deterrence is 
always necessary. Here the interaction with the aforementioned economic 
  
32  Markus Müller-Chen “Art 28” in Ingeborg Schwenzer (ed) Commentary on the UN Convention on 
the International Sales of Goods (CISG) (3rd ed, Oxford, 2010) at [21]; Andreas Björklund “Art 
28” in Stefan Kröll, Lukas Mistelis and Pilar Perales Viscasillas UN Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods (CISG) (Beck, Munich, 2011) at [19]. 
33  Only one case addressed art 28 directly, but also concluded that the requirements of the applicable 
national law are met:  Magellan International Corp v Salzgitter Handel GmbH, 76 F Supp 2d 919, 
(ND Illinois 1999) available at <www.cisg.law.pace.edu>; the limited importance in practice is 
common view under scholars: see Müller-Chen, above n 32, at [4]; Björklund, above n 32, at [2]. 
34  Honnold, above n 5, at 199; Anne-Florence Bock “Gewinnherausgabeansprüche gemäss CISG” in 
Andreas Büchler and Markus Müller-Chen (eds) Private Law, national – global – comparative: 
Festschrift für Ingeborg Schwenzer zum 60. Geburtstag (Bern, 2011) 175 at 185. 
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consideration and the interests of the contracting parties comes into play. In the 
beginning of this paper (see above II) a few contracts were mentioned, where even the 
plaintiff prefers or is at least equally satisfied with a monetary award instead of actual 
performance. Here the deterrent effect is less strong, because a strict deterrence is not 
needed to protect the aggrieved party. The seller will only be reluctant to breach the 
contract as long as the award of damages is higher than the economic benefits for him 
resulting from a breach. 
 
The primary aim of the remedies under the CISG is, therefore, to provide an effective 
protection of the contractual right to performance, as there is a functional connection 
between the primary right to performance and the remedy available upon a breach of 
contract. The remedy can be seen as a making good or a recognition of the claimant´s 
bargained for interest in performance.35 When determining what constitutes an 
effective protection, one has to search for the best solution possible, taking into 
consideration and evaluating various points. First of all, the characteristics of the 
contract in question, furthermore the interests of both parties including economic 
considerations and the level of deterrence needed. Zeller concludes correctly that 
“devising correct and just remedies that take account of both parties’ interests and are 
economically defensible are the key considerations for the success of any remedial 
system”.36  
2 Economic value approach often sufficient for protection of the 
performance interest  
After analysing that the core aim of a remedial system is to protect the contractual 
interest in performance, its influence on the award of damages needs to be discussed.  
Under the orthodox understanding of full compensation the aggrieved party receives 
the economic benefit it would have received if the contract had been properly 
performed. Hence, subject of compensation is actual economic loss. How can this 
approach, which seems to protect merely the economic end position of a contract 
rather than looking at the interest in the performance as such, be brought in line with 
an effective protection of the right to performance? 
 
The answer is, that in most cases the economic difference in value the party suffered 
because of the breach reflects the value of the right of performance the party was 
deprived of.37 If the aggrieved party can substitute the goods contracted for easily on 
the market, damages measured by the economic value reflect a monetary substitute of 
its right to performance. Only in this scenario of perfect substitutability of goods, is 
  
35  Barnett, above n 28, at 50; Pearce and Halson, above n 27, at 73. 
36  Bruno Zeller, above n 4, at 57. 
37  Barnett, above n 28, at 50; Pearce and Halson, above n 27, at 81. 
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the theory of efficient breach relevant.38 This theory has it roots in the common law 
systems.39 According to that theory a breach of contract may even be more efficient 
than its performance from an economic point of view. The aggrieved party is not 
worse off, because it is put in the same financial situation by the payment of damages, 
and the breaching party can allocate its resources where they have the highest value.40 
The theory relies on the presumption that the party, who is financially fully 
compensated, is indifferent between performance and the payment of damages. That 
is why the proponents of this theory conclude that the law should not discourage such 
an efficient breach.41  
 
Even if this theory is rooted in common law, it still has some influence on the 
interpretation of damages in the CISG. As elaborated above, economic considerations 
cannot and should not be fully ignored when evaluating what constitutes an effective 
remedy. However, the deficiency of the efficient breach theory is that its focus is 
wrong. Rather than looking at the contract and the right contracted for, it looks 
primarily at the economic end result. It assumes that to restore the financial situation 
of the aggrieved party will always be an effective protection of the right to 
performance. That this is not always the case is apparent in the existence of specific 
performance under the CISG.42 But there is no reason, why – once specific 
performance is no longer available – the considerations made above for remedies 
under the CISG in general should be disregarded, when deciding what is the best way 
to grant compensation for the ‘lost performance’.  
Consequently the economic approach may often constitute a sufficient protection of 
the right to performance, but there is nothing that strikes for the conclusion that the 
economic approach must remain the only available measure to receive full 
compensation for the infringed right to performance.    
  
38  For a comprehensive overview of the doctrine and a compilation of the criticism towards the 
doctrine see Barnett, above n 28, at 107–116. 
39  As ‘grandfather’ of this theory Justice Holmes is often cited who argued that “the duty to keep a 
contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it, – and 
nothing else” in Oliver Wendell Holmes “The Path of the Law” (1897) 10 Harvard L Rev 457 at 
462 as cited in Ingeborg Schwenzer, Pascal Hachem and Christopher Kee Global Sales and 
Contract Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) at [44.25], n 60. 
40  Djakhongir Saidov, above n 4, at 29. 
41  See Richard Posner Economic Analysis of Law  (6th ed, Aspen Publishers, New York, 2007) at 
119–126 who is one of the leading exponents of the theory of efficient breach. 
42  Art 28 CISG, which has been discussed above is not at odds with this assumption. 
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3 Compensation measured by gains – Disgorgement of profit under the 
CISG? 
If compensation is defined in a broader sense as a making good of the right to 
performance, this may open the way to another option to measure damages: Damages 
measured by the gains made by the contracting party as a result of the breach instead 
of the actual economic loss. Here a line must be drawn between (partial) 
disgorgement that is used to ease the evidentiary burden, where economic loss is 
indisputably caused but difficult to quantify, and full disgorgement of profit 
irrespective of economic loss. For the former the case at the beginning of this paper 
(goods produced under child labour conditions) may be an example. We have seen 
that the gains are a yardstick to measure the economic loss, therefore following the 
orthodox understanding of full compensation. 
 
However, the more interesting question is if the CISG allows full disgorgement of 
profit. The consequence of such an award would be a preventive effect. Although 
disgorgement damages are awarded after breach of contract had already happened, the 
consequence of disgorgement is its influence on future behaviour. For the particular 
defendant the incentive to break a contract in the future is little, if he knows that 
‘breach does not pay’. Likewise disgorgement has a general deterrence effect, as it 
warns other possible contract breakers of possible consequences.43   
 
The question whether the CISG provides for a claim of disgorgement of profit is not 
expressly stated in the CISG, nor expressly excluded as a possible calculation of 
damages. The drafting history of the CISG shows that the availability of 
“disgorgement” was not discussed.44 However, this is not surprising, because when 
the CISG was drafted in the 1980s the issue of disgorgement of profit in contract law 
had not yet emerged neither in civil law countries nor in common law countries.45 The 
CISG Advisory Council, which addresses from time to time emerging questions 
regarding the application and interpretation of the CISG, stated that the CISG does not 
provide for punitive damages, but did not mention the issue of disgorgement of 
profit.46 At this point it is worth mentioning that the concepts of the aforementioned 
  
43  Barnett, above n 28, at 26; Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen Law and Economics (4th ed, Pearson 
Addison Wesley, 2004) at 249; James Edelmann “Gain-Based Damages and Compensation” in 
Andrew Burrows and Lord Rodger of Earlsferry Mapping the Law: Essays in Memory of Peter 
Birks  (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006) 141 at 149. 
44  See the protocols of the UNCITRAL deliberations in Honnold, above n 8, at 191, 232, 238, 253 and 
352; see also Secretariat Commentary on the 1878 Draft, above n 8, art 70. 
45  the development towards an award of disgorgement damages in contract law is a still developing 
field of law (see below II 3 a ii 1). 
46  CISG Advisory Council, above n 6, at 9. 
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consequences of breach of contract are different. Disgorgement is concerned to 
restore the breaching party in the same economic situation but for the breach, making 
the party indifferent between actual performance and breach. It does not go beyond 
this point. In contrast, the aim of punitive damages is to punish or make an example of 
the wrongdoer for “conduct which was outrageous in disregard of the plaintiff’s right” 
and could go beyond the actual gain.47 The study of the opinions of the most common 
commentators on the CISG reveals that there is still open disagreement on the issue of 
disgorgement of profit, so that the question still needs to be addressed.48 
a. Gap-filling pursuant to art 7  
Art 7 as the ‘gap-filling’ provision of the CISG helps to cope with new developments 
or questions that have not been foreseen or have been overlooked during the drafting 
process. Art 7(2) states that matters covered by the Convention but not expressly 
settled must be tried to be filled with the general principles of the Convention, leaving 
the recourse to applicable domestic law as ultima ratio. Remedies after a breach of 
contract are “rights arising from the contract”, hence matters covered by the CISG 
according to art 4.49 While searching for general principles within the four corners of 
the CISG, attention must also be paid to the general aim to respect the international 
character of the Convention and to promote uniformity in the application.50  
 
As there is no enumeration of general principles in the CISG, general principles can 
be found in the explicit wording of provisions as well as in case law and literature 
where they are established progressively by judges and scholars interpreting the  
provisions of the CISG.51  
The following part will examine possible principles in order to find an answer 
whether the CISG covers disgorgement of profit. 
 
  
47   Kuddus v Chief Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary [2002] 2 AC 122 (HL) at [68]. 
48  In favour of disgorgement of profit: Schwenzer, above n 6, at [43] with citations for the opposite 
view prevailing mainly amongst German scholars.  
49  It is the prevailing opinion in the literature that the CISG provides for a conclusive set of rights after 
a breach of contract. Generally speaking „domestic rules that turn on substantially the same facts as 
the rules of the Convention must be displaced by the Convention“, Honnold cited in Ingeborg 
Schwenzer und Pascal Hachem „Art 4” in Ingeborg Schwenzer (ed) Commentary on the UN 
Convention on the International Sales of Goods (CISG) (3rd ed, Oxford 2010) at [19]. 
50  Article 7(1) CISG. 
51  An example for a principle clearly named in the CISG is the principle of good faith under art 7(1). 
Principles developed by scholars and case law are for example the principle of ‘venire contra 
factum propium’ (art 16(2)b and art 29(2)) as well as the principle of party autonomy and freedom 
of contract embodied in art 6.  
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i. Art 84 (2) 
At first sight, one provision seems attractive regarding the disgorgement of profit as a 
legal consequence of a breach of contract: Article 84 (2). This rule applies in cases of 
avoidance of contract. It is a supplement to the general consequence of avoidance that 
parties have to restore what they have received as a consequence of performance of 
the contract.52 Concerning the buyer, his obligation to return the received goods does 
include any benefit that he has derived from the goods. 
The problem with the application of that rule to an award of disgorgement of profits is 
that art 84 (2) concerns the restoration of the economical ex ante situation for both 
parties, because the duty to perform ceases to exist after avoidance.53 In contrast, 
damages concern the compensation for the non-performance of the contract.  
Hence, no direct principal in regard to damages can be established from art 84 (2). 
However, it can be stated that at least the legal effect that a party is stripped of its 
actual profit is not totally unfamiliar to the CISG. 
ii. Art 74  
Disgorgement of profit in contract law constitutes a monetary award after the breach 
of a contract. Hence, it needs to be examined whether the principle of full 
compensation can serve as a gap-filling instrument. In the first part of the paper it was 
concluded that a broader conception of full compensation as a “making good” for the 
contractual right infringed could be derived from the general aim of remedies to 
establish an effective protection of the right to performance. 
 
In fact, there is an international trend questioning if the economic approach to receive 
full compensation is always an effective protection of the right to performance. As art 
7(1) guides us that every interpretation needs to bear in mind the international 
character of the CISG and its aim to create a uniform set of rules, any gap-filling 
should be guided by the search for a common understanding acceptable in all 
jurisdictions. The following comparative analysis aims at finding an internationally 
acceptable approach.  
1. National tendencies and comparative analysis  
a. Common Law jurisdictions 
England has a pioneering role in the international trend to allow disgorgement of 
profit as a remedy in contract law. Originally English law provided for disgorgement 
of profit only in particular types of contract, as the breach of fiduciary duty, breach of 
  
52  Article 81 (2) contains the general rule of restitution after avoidance of contract.  
53  Christiana Fountoulakis “Art 84” in Ingeborg Schwenzer (ed) Commentary on the UN Convention 
on the International Sales of Goods (CISG) (3rd ed, Oxford, 2010) at [6]. 
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confidence and some proprietary torts.54 Disgorgement of profit for a ‘pure’ breach of 
contract was first awarded in Attorney-General v Blake.55 Blake was a Soviet spy, 
who worked for the British Secret Intelligence Service. Under his terminated 
employment contract he undertook to not disclose any information gained as a result 
of his employment, during as well as after his time as an informant. He breached the 
contract by publishing an autobiography about his time as an agent. The House of 
Lords awarded an account of all the profit of the book that Blake had not yet received 
from the publisher and based the award on the breach of the employment contract. 
Lord Nicholls acknowledged that this was a new step in English contract law and 
concluded that an account for profit should only be awarded “exceptionally”.56  
Although he stated that all circumstances need to be taken into account, he gave some 
guidance on what constitutes an exceptional case. Firstly, disgorgement is a remedy of 
last resort, when other remedies as damages measured by the economic loss are 
inadequate. Secondly the aggrieved party has to have a “legitimate interest” in 
preventing the party in breach from profit making.57 Although Lord Hobhouse noted 
in his dissenting speech to the judgement that “to extend that exceptional case to 
commercial situations … will require careful consideration” disgorgement damages 
were discussed and partly awarded shortly afterwards in several commercial cases.58 
Especially cases concerning a breach of a negative covenant which appear to be 
difficult as to find clear reasons whether an award of full disgorgement or only partial 
disgorgement is adequate.59 Likewise the doctrinal basis of an award of disgorgement 
of profit is controversially discussed in the literature.60 
  
54  See for a closer study of the mentioned categories where disgorgement is traditionally available in 
English Law: Stephen Watterson “Gain-Based Remedies for Civil Wrongs in England and Wales” 
in Ewoud Hondius and André Janssen (ed.) Disgorgement of Profits: Gain Based Remedies 
throughout the World (Springer International Publishing, Switzerland, 2015) 29 at 45–56.  
55  Attorney General v Blake [2001] AC 268 (HL).  
56  At 285 G. 
57  At 285 H. 
58  At 299 E. 
59  Esso Petroleum Company Ltd v Niad Ltd [2001] EWHC Ch 458 (Ch) Niad ran a petrol station 
selling exclusively Esso´s petrol. Under the contract, Niad undertook to follow a pricing agreement. 
Niad should stick to the resale price Esso dictated and Esso provided a discount to the sale price in 
recompense. Niad breached that price-watch agreement. The court granted total disgorgement of 
profit as it was difficult to assess the economic loss consisting in lost consumers because of higher 
resale prices. 
  The other two decisions World Wide Fund for Nature v World Wrestling Federation Entertainment 
Inc [2002] FSR 32 (Ch) and Experience Hendrix LLC v PPX Enterprises Inc, Edward Chalpin 
[2003] EWLR 25 (CA) concerned breaches of settlement agreements. Rather than full 
disgorgement the courts ordered the breaching party to pay a reasonable part of its profits reflecting 
the value of a relaxation of the right under the settlement agreement. 
60  See Andrew Burrows “Are ‘Damages on the Wrotham Park Basis’ Compensatory, Restitutionary or 
Neither” in Djakhongir Saidov and Ralph Cunnington (eds) Contract Damages: Domestic and 
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Australia has not yet followed the English example and has not extended the 
availability of disgorgement of profit in contract law. This has, to a large part, to do 
with present resistance of courts to detach availability of disgorgement of profit from 
its historic roots.61 Courts tend to adhere to the strict division between common law 
and equity, disgorgement of profit available only in the latter case. However, a 
number of Australian academics suggest a more flexible and modern approach of 
disgorgement of profit in private law.62  
 
In regard to New Zealand Attorney-General for England and Wales v R was the 
parallel case to the English Blake case.63 However, the facts were slightly different, 
because the parties had expressively agreed on disgorgement as a remedy through a 
contractual provision. Until now New Zealand’s courts have not been required to 
decide about a general availability of disgorgement of profit in contract law and its 
possible requirements.64 Nonetheless, a hint towards a more flexible approach to 
disgorgement of profit is implied by the judgement of Paper Reclaim Ltd v Aotearoa 
International Ltd.65 Although the judgment concerned the availability of punitive 
damages for a breach of contract, its reasoning is of relevance. One argument why 
punitive damages were considered as generally not necessary in contract law, was the 
fact that remedies exist which already fulfill some of the objectives of punitive 
damages: Disgorgement of profit in contract with reference to Blake was explicitly 
named in the list of contract remedies.66 
                                                                                                                                            
International Perspectives (Hart Publishing, Portland (Oregon), 2008) 165; and Ralph Cunnington 
“The Measure and Availability of Gain-based Damages for Breach of Contract” in Djakhongir 
Saidov and Ralph Cunnington (eds) Contract Damages: Domestic and International Perspectives 
(Hart Publishing, Portland (Oregon), 2008) 207. 
61  Katy Barnett “Disgorgement of Profits in Australian Private Law” in Ewoud Hondius and André 
Janssen (ed.) Disgorgement of Profits: Gain Based Remedies throughout the World (Springer 
International Publishing, Switzerland, 2015) 13 at 25; and Sirko Harder “Measuring damages in the 
law of obligations” (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2010) at 226, where Harder suggests, based on the 
doctrine of restitution for wrongs, the availability of disgorgement of profit in cases of an exclusive 
entitlement to the right, including contractual rights. 
62  Barnett, above n 61, at 25. 
63  Attorney-General for England and Wales v R [2002] 2 NZLR 91 (CA). 
64  In Astra Pharmaceuticals (NZ) Ltd v Pharmaceutical Management Ltd [2001] 1 NZLR 415 (CA) 
the breach of a contractual confidentiality clause was at issue. However the Court did not enter into 
a discussion of disgorgement of profit in contract law, because the case was ultimately treated as a 
loss of chance.  
65  Paper Reclaim Ltd v Aotearoa International Ltd [2006] 3 NZLR 188 (CA). 
66   At [182]. 
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b. Civil Law jurisdictions 
Similar to Common Law countries there is yet no general concept for the availability 
of disgorgement of profit in German law. Rather it is narrowly tied to specific cases in 
commercial law where there is a particular fiduciary relationship between the parties, 
for example between employees and business owners, partners of a commercial 
business or directors and administrators of a stock company. In those relationships 
disgorgement is provided explicitly for the prohibition of competition.67 Apart from 
these provisions disgorgement often requires infringement of an absolute right rather 
than a contractual obligation.68  
 
However, it was recently discussed at the 66th German Jurists’ Forum whether 
deriving from the existence of s 687 (2) German Civil Code (Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch), a general provision should be adopted, allowing to claim for 
disgorgement of profit in case of an intentional breach of a person’s right.69 
Consequently such a provision would include contractual rights. At the moment s 
687 (2) BGB has a very little scope of application, because the wording requires a 
benefit from an intentional management of another person’s affairs without the 
person´s knowledge. The prevailing view in literature and case law interprets 
‘management of another person´s affairs’ in a narrow way, hence, not including 
contractual situations.70  
The proposal for a general provision based on s 687 (2) BGB was finally rejected, 
presumably in part because of the very general wording that had only required an 
intentional infringement.71 However, there was a widespread agreement that 
disgorgement, with its absolute deterrent effect, is a preferable solution for the 
  
67  Section 61(1) and s 113(1) Handelsgesetzbuch (German Commercial Code); s 88(2) Aktiengesetz 
(Companies Act). 
68  See possibilities to disgorge profit after the infringement of an intellectual property right in s 139(2) 
Patentgesetz (Patent Law), s 79(2) Urheberrechtsgesetz (Copyright Law) and s 14(6) Markengesetz 
(Trademark Law); disgorgement was also seen as possible after the infringement of personality 
rights, where disgorgement was seen as one from of compensation, in order to achieve ‘a real 
deterrent effect’; see Caroline von Monaco [2005] BGHZ 128, 1 at 16. 
69  Gerhard Wagner proposed to include the following subsection 3 to the general provision in German 
Civil Code (BGB) concerning the scope of damages in s 251 BGB (hence regulating breaches of 
tort as well as breaches of contract): “Where the person liable in damages has intentionally 
infringed the obligee’s [the injured party’s] right, the obligee can – instead of compensation – 
demand disgorgement of the profits achieved by the person liable in damages and that he renders 
account of those profits.”  
70  German Federal Court (Bundesgerichtshof) Neue Juristische Wochenzeitschrift 1988, 3018 as cited 
in Tobias Helms “Disgorgement of Profits in German Law” in Ewoud Hondius and André Janssen 
(ed.) Disgorgement of Profits: Gain Based Remedies throughout the World (Springer International 
Publishing, Switzerland, 2015) 219 at 220 with further citations. 
71  Helms, above n 70, at 220, n 8. 
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intentional infringement of another person’s right.72 That fact implies that German 
scholars see at least partly a lack of effective protection of legal rights and a need for 
development.73 One might not exclude that this also applies to contract law, 
irrespective of what the requirements for disgorgement might be.  
 
France, likewise, has so far a ‘sectoral’ approach towards disgorgement of profit that 
concentrates on tort law. Disgorgement of profit is explicitly named in the legislation 
concerning the protection of intellectual property rights. In the past the infringement 
of personality rights through the press led to judgements allowing disgorgement of 
profits, even if the legal basis is unclear, because judges referred to a flexible way of 
calculating non-pecuniary loss. Scholars support the idea of a legal comprehensive 
framework for the availability of disgorgement of illicit profit. Even if the discussion 
seems to focus on a solution in the area of tort law, influences on contract law are 
shown by the preliminary draft bill for a reform of contract law proposed by a group 
of scholars led by Professor Terré in 2009. Art 120 provided for a partial or full 
disgorgement in cases of ‘lucrative fraud’, “i.e. where a party willfully fails to comply 
with the law, preferring to risk a conviction and damages so as to be able, for 
example, to conclude contracts elsewhere, in more advantageous conditions”.74 It has 
to be noted that this provision is more likely to be characterized as a proposal of 
punitive damages in contract law, as it merely requires a deliberate breach.75  
c. Mixed jurisdictions 
Israel granted disgorgement of profit long before Blake. In fact Israeli law provides 
for an extensive set of remedies after a breach of contract; ones deriving from the law 
of contracts as well as ones deriving from the law of unjust enrichment. Disgorgement 
as a remedy under unjust enrichment law is therefore generally available in contract 
  
72  Helms, above n 70, at 220, n 7. 
73  Disgorgement in German contract law has also been the question of recent scholarly writing: See 
Tobias Helms Gewinnherausgabe als haftungsrechtliches Problem (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 
2007) and Ole Böger System der vorteilsorientierten Haftung im Vertrag (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 
2009). 
74  Art 120 of the ‘avant-projet de réforme Terré du droit des contrats’: “Toutefois, en cas de dol, le 
créancier de l’obligation inexécutée peut préférer demander au juge que le débiteur soit condamné à 
lui verser tout ou partie du profit retiré de l’inexécution”, as cited in Michel Séjean “The 
Disgorgement of Illicit Profits in French Law” in Ewoud Hondius and André Janssen (ed.) 
Disgorgement of Profits: Gain Based Remedies throughout the World (Springer International 
Publishing, Switzerland, 2015) 121 at 133, n 67 and translated as  ‘However, in the case of fraud, 
the creditor of the unperformed obligation may prefer to ask the judge that the debtor be ordered to 
pay him all or part of the profit made from the non-performance.’  
75  See Séjean, above n 74, at 133. 
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law irrespective of any loss.76 Interestingly, the landmark decision for disgorgement 
in contract Adras Building Material v Harlow & Jones GmbH concerned an 
international commercial sales contract. In 1973 the defendant, a German company, 
contracted to sell the plaintiff, an Israeli company, iron for a pre-determined price.77 
Due to political instability in the buyer’s region, the delivery was delayed. A few 
months later after a partial delivery the seller informed the buyer that he had to sell 
the iron to a third party due to high storage costs. In fact the market price for iron had 
spiked in the meantime and the seller was able to sell the iron to a third party for a 
profitable price. The buyer had not made a cover purchase and had not avoided the 
contract but claimed for damages consisting of the seller’s profit under the 
Convention related to a Uniform law for the International Sale of Goods (ULIS, the 
predecessor of the CISG). The Court initially dismissed the claim under art 82 ULIS 
(equivalent to art 74 CISG), because the price for iron had dropped again at the time 
of the proceedings, so there was no loss, and under 84 ULIS because the provision 
required the avoidance of the contract which had not taken place.78 However, the 
Court applied the national law of unjust enrichment and argued that:  
 
The injured party has a right not only to compensation for breach of contract, but 
also to specific performance . . . Therefore, under Israeli law, a buyer in a 
contract of sale is entitled to receive the subject-matter of the sale, and an 
enrichment of the seller which infringes this right is an unjust enrichment at the 
buyer’s expense.79  
 
Contrary to the wide approach in Israel an analysis of current developments in South 
Africa shows that even if some scholars favor a development towards disgorgement of 
profit, yet only in exceptional circumstances, they struggle to place disgorgement in 
South Africa’s existing set of private law. Within the law of contract South Africa 
follows a strict rule of compensation for patrimonial loss, so that any gain based 
approach to calculate damages is unknown. It is argued that the law of unjust could 
provide a further doctrinal basis for disgorgement of profit, however, a condition is 
that the enrichment is unjustified which is prima facie questionable due to the 
  
76  Talia Einhorn “Disgorgement of Profits in Israeli Law” in Ewoud Hondius and André Janssen (ed.) 
Disgorgement of Profits: Gain Based Remedies throughout the World (Springer International 
Publishing, Switzerland, 2015) 299 at 302. 
77  Adras Building Material v Harlow & Jones GmbH  (1995) 42(1) PD 221, translated in (1995) 3 
Restitution Law Review 235 (SC of Israel, 1988), abstract available at 
<www.cisgw3.law.pace.edu>.  
78  Art 84 ULIS is the predecessor of art 76 CISG. However, the prevailing view today applies art 76 
CISG also to cases where avoidance was not declared but the seller showed its definite and final 
refusal to perform, see Ingeborg Schwenzer “Art 76” in Ingeborg Schwenzer (ed) Commentary on 
the UN Convention on the International Sales of Goods (CISG) (3rd ed, Oxford 2010) at [3].   
79  At 271. 
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existence of a valid contract.80 Nevertheless there are some local commentators who 
favor a development towards disgorgement of profit in contract law as an exceptional 
remedy.81 
 
As a summary the comparative analysis shows that at this point there is no 
international ‘one-fits all solution’ under which circumstances disgorgement of profit 
is necessary in contract law. Notwithstanding, irrespective of the stage of 
‘development’ the national jurisdictions are – reaching from scholar writing on one 
hand to existing case law on the other –, one fact can be stated: Jurisdictions all over 
the world discuss the issue of disgorgement in contract law. That implies that to a 
certain degree they see a deficiency in their existing set of remedies after a breach of 
contract.82  
2. ‘Uniform interpretation’ via ‘Uniform evolution’  
Consequently, even if there has not yet emerged a uniform approach, it is the uniform 
development and discussion that the CISG should keep pace with in order to retain its 
successful standing in international commercial relationships. It is correct when Bock 
concludes that art 7 calls not only for a ‘uniform interpretation’ but also for a 
‘uniform evolution’.83 There are several reasons that support that finding.  
 
Firstly, the CISG is not supposed to be a rigid law. Like national jurisdictions, it must 
keep pace with the new developments, finding internationally acceptable answers to 
practical realities in a more complex global world. International trade has developed 
since the 1980s and with it the idea what deserves protection under the law of 
damages. The history of the CISG shows the Convention has already demonstrated its 
flexibility to cope with new questions on the law of damages. The compensation for 
  
80  Jacque du Plessis and Daniel Visser “Disgorgement of Profit in South African Law” in Ewoud 
Hondius and André Janssen (eds) Disgorgement of Profits: Gain Based Remedies throughout the 
World (Springer International Publishing, Switzerland, 2015) 345 at 358. 
81  See Blackie, J., and I. Farlam. “Enrichment by act of the party enriched” in R. Zimmermann, D. 
Visser, and K. Reid (eds) Mixed legal systems in comparative perspective (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2004) at 469, 493 and Daniel Visser Unjustified enrichment. (Cape Town, 2008) at 696; 
Jacque du Plessis The South African law of unjustified enrichment (Cape Town, 2012); all as cited 
in Plessis and Visser, above n 80, at 359, n 72. 
82  See Ewoud Hondius and André Janssen (eds) Disgorgement of Profits: Gain Based Remedies 
throughout the World (Springer International Publishing, Switzerland, 2015) 499 who, after a 
broader analysis of national reports on the availability of gain-based remedies in different branches 
of law, including contract law, conclude that “despite the many efforts towards preventing and 
disgorging unlawful profits, either through the (partial) use of disgorgement damages or through 
corresponding functional equivalents, the majority of the national reporters have criticised the 
inefficiency of their own legal system.” 
83  Bock, above n 34, at 184. 
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loss of reputation is one example.84 However, a strong argument to negate damages 
that reflect the defendant´s gain irrespective of any economic loss is the wording of 
art 74.85 Indeed, the mentioning of “lost profits” in the provision implies that loss 
refers to actual economic loss and contradicts the availability of disgorgement as a 
gain-based damage award irrespective of any economic loss. However, it can be 
questioned whether the wording should hinder an evolution towards the availability of 
disgorgement under the principle of full compensation. The wording of art 74 
represents the status quo in the 1980s. In this stage, the drafters thought their solution 
based on economic loss to be an appropriate one. However, the Commentary on the 
1978 Draft shows that flexibility was considered as a core function of art 74.86 
Furthermore, from a practical point of view, any amendment to the text of the CISG 
requires a time consuming and complex process including plenary meetings of the 
contracting states and once a new wording is agreed on, a new ratification in each 
State. Even though practical issues cannot serve as justification for itself, they can 
support the idea that wording should not be the decisive factor. 
Ultimately, one point should be stressed: To negate a possible claim for disgorgement 
for profit under the principle of full compensation, because an international coherent 
approach is not yet apparent, may eventually lead to the fact that the Convention 
undermines its principal aim to promote legal uniformity in international sales and 
becomes an out-dated set of rules. Even if we acknowledge that the development of 
disgorgement of profit is at an early stage, once national law has further developed, 
parties may opt out of the CISG and decide to govern their contract by national law 
which provides a more extensive set of remedies.87  
iii. Principle of good faith, fair dealing and favor 
contractus 
After all, the principle of good faith and fair dealing, stated expressly in art 7(1) can 
be evoked in support of a disgorgement of profit claim. This principle must be applied 
with caution, because art 7(1) cannot establish complete new rights and obligations 
under the CISG. Rather the principle of good faith influences and shapes the existing 
  
84  It is widely accepted that this kind of loss can be considered in the calculation of damages. 
However the level of proof and whether the loss has to manifest itself in demonstrable financial loss 
or if this kind is compensation for non-pecuniary loss is still being discussed: See John Gotanda, 
above n 15, at [63] and Schwenzer, above n 6, at [34]. 
85  Seeing that as the decisive factor against disgorgement of profit under art 74: Schmidt-Ahrendt, 
above n 22, at 97. 
86  Secretariat Commentary on the 1978 Draft, above n 8, at [4]: “The court or arbitral tribunal must 
calculate that loss in the manner which is best suited to the circumstances”. 
87  This concern is mentioned by all commentators who have discussed the issue of disgorgement of 
profit: Schmidt-Ahrendt, above n 22, at 95; Bock, above n 34, at 184; Schwenzer and Hachem, 
above n 19, at 102. 
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content of the CISG.88 Although, at first sight, disgorgement of profit appears as a 
new remedial right, it is not the principle of good faith that creates disgorgement of 
profit, but rather a broader concept of full compensation, which is influenced by the 
principle of good faith. Damages are a remedy after a breach of contract. The chapter 
about the aims of the remedial system under the CISG (above III B 1) has shown that 
remedies are needed to protect what the parties bargained for in the first place, namely 
the performance of the contract. Remedies therefore reflect a framework that aims to 
promote an efficient but also fair dealing, considering the interests of both parties as 
well as economic considerations. With its preventive effect disgorgement of profit 
could promote fair dealing also in the precontractual stage. Parties would be 
encouraged to consider more carefully whether they want to enter into a contract and 
to exchange information valuable to the other party beforehand rather than 
unilaterally breaching the contract afterwards. Likewise, such a development would 
also support the principle of the CISG to keep a contract alive as long as possible 
(favor contractus). The restrictive provisions regarding the avoidance of a contract 
clearly indicate that the threshold to terminate a contract is set deliberately high.89 
Ultimately the availability of disgorgement could prevent unnecessary disputes and 
enhance the efficiency of trade.90  
b. Summary 
In conclusion, there are strong arguments to allow, in principal, a claim for 
disgorgement of profit under the CISG. However, one important question remains still 
unanswered: Which factors will decide whether disgorgement of profit is necessary to 
provide an effective protection of the right to performance? The next chapter will 
examine this question, however, the CISG, just like national systems, will have to 
consider with great caution which cases require disgorgement of profit after a breach 
of contract. 
C Where Is the Boundary – Full Compensation Measured by Economic Value vs. 
Full Compensation Measured by Gain 
Before examining which factors might be relevant, there are two statements that can 
be concluded as a starting point.  
Firstly, the economic approach was considered to be an adequate compensation in 
most cases. Where the party is adequately compensated with the economic value, 
  
88  Ingeborg Schwenzer und Pascal Hachem “Art 7” in Ingeborg Schwenzer (ed) Commentary on the 
UN Convention on the International Sales of Goods (CISG) (3rd ed, Oxford 2010) at [19]. 
89  See art 49 CISG and art 64 which require a special ground for a avoidance which can either be a 
fundamental breach or the expiry of a additional time limit to perform (Nachfrist procedure in art 49 
(1)b for the buyer and 64(1)b for the seller).  
90  Considerations of good faith are also mentioned by Schmidt-Ahrendt, above n 22, at 94. 
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there is no need for the deterrent effect of disgorgement of profit. Likewise where the 
aggrieved party can claim performance itself, this is the best protection of its right to 
performance, as the party gets what it has bargained for. Therefore, disgorgement will 
always be the ‘ultima ratio’ remedy, only available if damages based on economic 
loss are an ineffective protection of the performance right and the claim to require 
performance itself is not available anymore.91 
Secondly, and this follows from the previous paragraph, the mere fact that a party 
breached a contract intentionally cannot be a sufficient factor to claim disgorgement 
of profit. A general rule that ‘breach should never pay’ cannot be established, as this 
would contradict the rule of disgorgement as a last resort. Rather, the right point of 
reference is the right of performance under the specific contract.  
 
The question is therefore which factors might constitute the special value of the right 
to performance, so that damages based on the economic value are inadequate? 
 
It should be noted that the answer to this question should also be guided by a uniform 
approach, therefore developing factors that might be accepted internationally 
irrespective of the national legal system. However, solutions cannot be found out of 
nothing. Especially the literature discussing the English development can serve as a 
valuable source to shape rules that may influence the availability of disgorgement of 
profit in international sales contracts. 
1 Considerations of specific performance 
Some factors that influence the decision on specific performance are equally valuable 
for the decision on disgorgement of profit. This has to do with the fact that Common 
Law has already identified cases where damages are considered as an insufficient 
remedy.92 In fact disgorgement of profit is often referred to as the ‘monetised form’ of 
specific performance.93 Similar to the effect that specific relief compels the defendant 
to perform, disgorgement of profit transfers this into the absolute deterrent effect to 
prevent future breaches of contract. Parallel to the availability of specific performance 
Barnett proposes to allow disgorgement of profit in second sales cases where the 
  
91  Bock, above n 34, at 186. 
92  Cunnington identifies five situations: Cases where no market substitute is available, cases where 
damages are difficult to quantify cases where the breaching party will not be able to pay damages, 
cases where only nominal damages are available and cases where the type of loss is not recoverable 
in Ralp Cunnington “The Inadequacy of Damages as a Remedy for Breach of Contract” in Charles 
EF Rickett Justifying Private Law Remedies (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2008) 115.  
93  Jack Beatson The Use and Abuse of Unjust Enrichment – Essays on the Law of Restitution  (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1991) 17; a connection between disgorgement and specific relief is also 
drawn by Cunnington, above n 60, at 207. 
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goods are not able to (or difficult to) be substituted with money.94 In international 
commercial contracts this scenario will be rather rare. Most of the time, commercial 
goods will be substitutable. However, the supply of natural resources is one example 
where a situation of no substitutability is feasible. In the decision mentioned above; 
Adras Building Material v Harlow & Jones GmbH the Court unfortunately did not 
make any reference in its reasoning to the question of whether the buyer would have 
been able to make a cover purchase on the market. This would have provided a 
reasonable limitation to the wide application that seems to allow disgorgement 
without restrictions.95  
Likewise, the breach of a contract that concerns the supply of goods over a long-term 
period may have a similar effect for the aggrieved party. Imagine the market for wine 
and assume that producers usually are bound by long-term contracts for the supply of 
a certain percentage of the annual harvest. If the seller breaches this contract to 
deliver profit to a third party, the aggrieved party will face difficulties to find a similar 
supplier due to the particularities of the market. In these two cases an award of the 
economic loss cannot place the party in a situation as good as actual performance 
because it had a special interest to obtain the goods as such.  
2 Non-economic or subjective interest in performance  
Another factor where damages based on the difference of the economic value may be 
inadequate is the fact that the buyer has a non-economic, intangible interest in the 
goods. An example additionally to the production under child labour is the contractual 
agreement involving the supply of natural resources with the obligation that the goods 
must not have their origin in political conflict areas, where trading of these resources 
is used to finance the conflicting parties.96 Contract law should be able to provide an 
efficient protection of such contractual obligations. Compensation measured by the 
difference in value is inadequate, because the explicit duty that has been breached is a 
non-economic one. Here again the deterrent effect of disgorgement of profit in case of 
a breach is a last option to provide an effective protection of the right contracted for. 
Needless to say the protection of the above mentioned interests is also appreciated for 
public policy reasons. It is clear that public policy reasons cannot establish private law 
remedies; however, once parties willingly agree on ethical standards and transfer them 
into the private law sector, the law should recognise this.  
 
  
94  Barnett, above n 28, at 94. 
95   At 99. 
96  Example mentioned in Bock, above n 34, at 186. 
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3 Negative covenants and the subject matter of the contract 
English case law following the Blake decision shows that special difficulties may 
arise from contracts containing a specific duty not to do something. There have been 
cases with a commercial background as Esso Petroleum Company Ltd v Niad Ltd 
where the defendant was ordered to disgorge all its profits;97 on the contrary in cases 
like World Wide Fund for Nature v World Wrestling Federation Entertainment Inc. 
the breach of the negative obligation led only to a partial disgorgement, arguing that 
the amount represents the value of a fictional renegotiation between the parties.98  
The breach of negative covenants might arise under the CISG in regard to 
confidentiality clauses as well as the exclusive distribution agreements between 
producer and wholesaler that prohibit the import in other countries.99 Even the 
example regarding the production without child labour can be seen as a negative 
covenant, as the wording as negative or positive obligation is a matter of coincidence.  
The problem here is, that the contracting party will argue to always have a legitimate 
interest in performance as such, because unlike a positive obligation it is not possible 
to substitute the performance with a monetary award.100 However, following this 
approach, a breach of a negative covenant would always lead to disgorgement. The 
wide application of disgorgement of profit is not consistent with the above-mentioned 
hierarchy of remedies and disgorgement as last resort.  
 
Establishing limiting factors is challenging. One factor could be to look at whether the 
compliance with the provisions constitutes a fundamental duty of the contract. 
However, this is also a flawed approach, because here as well parties will argue that 
they would not have agreed on the duty if it had not been of great importance to one 
party. 
  
97  Esso Petroleum Company Ltd v Niad Ltd [2001] EWHC Ch 458 (Ch); Niad ran a petrol station 
selling exclusively Esso´s petrol. Under the contract, Niad undertook to follow a pricing agreement. 
Niad should stick to the resale price Esso dictated and Esso provided a discount to the sale price in 
recompense. Niad breached the price-watch agreement. Judge Morrit V-C granted total 
disgorgement of profit for three main reasons: Firstly because of the difficulty to calculate the 
economic loss, secondly because the obligation to implement and maintain the recommended pump 
prices was fundamental to Pricewatch, thirdly, because Esso undoubtedly has a legitimate interest 
in preventing Niad from profiting from its breach of obligation. 
98  World Wide Fund for Nature v World Wrestling Federation Entertainment Inc [2002] FSR 32 (Ch) 
and Experience Hendrix LLC v PPX Enterprises Inc, Edward Chalpin [2003] EWLR 25 (CA). 
99  See Stockholm Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Award of 5 April 2007 (Pressure sensors case) 
available at <www.cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/070405s5> where the breach of confidentiality 
clause was at issue and damages were measured by the gains over a period of 2 years; and SARL 
BRI Production ‘Bonaventure’ v Société Pan African Export Appellate Court Grenoble (France) 22 
February 1995 available at <www.cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950222f1.html>. 
100 Barnett, above n 28, at 125. 
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A further solution could be to allow full disgorgement only in cases of a subjective 
non-economic interest. This would mean that in the child labour case full 
disgorgement would be awarded but not necessarily in cases of breach of 
confidentiality. The confidentiality agreement will usually serve for the protection of 
economically valuable information, for example intellectual property or client 
databases. In these cases the gain made by the breaching party should serve as a 
yardstick to calculate the economic loss. In fact, this way of calculation could have 
the same effect as total disgorgement, if the court comes to the conclusion that the 
economic value represents the total amount of the gains, however, it is based on the 
compensation for economic loss. 
4 Principle of foreseeability and causation as further limitation 
Ultimately it needs to be emphasised that the rules of foreseeability and causation as 
limitations of art 74 also apply to the availability of disgorgement. The circumstances 
why the court ultimately decides for disgorgement as an appropriate remedy must 
have been known or ought to have been known by the party in breach at the moment 
of conclusion of the contract. Furthermore disgorgement of profit concerns only gains 
that could not have been made but for the breach.  
D Summary 
As a first conclusion, we can summarize that the CISG should provide for 
disgorgement of profit as an ultima ratio remedy, where damages measured by the 
difference of economic value are not an effective protection of the right to 
performance. Firstly, an analysis of the remedies under the CISG provides that the 
aim of remedies is to protect the right of performance effectively. The orthodox 
understanding of damages measured by the loss of economic value is often sufficient, 
but national tendencies imply that discussion about the acceptance of disgorgement as 
an additional way to award damages calls for a broader understanding of the full 
compensation principle in art 74 as the compensation or making good for the right 
that the aggrieved party has been deprived of. That there is no international 
comprehensive framework when disgorgement should be available in contract law yet 
should not hinder a parallel development towards disgorgement of profit under the 
CISG.  
 
IV Legal Costs Under Art 74  
An aggrieved party faces different financial detriments. There are the aforementioned 
that are closely linked to the subject of the contract, but parties also often suffer great 
financial expenses due to attorneys’ fees as a result of necessary court proceedings. 
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On a national basis, two different approaches exist to the recovery of such expenses: 
The United States of America and Japan follow the so called ‘American Rule’ where 
each party bears its own costs irrespective of the outcome of the lawsuit. A 
reimbursement of costs is, apart from special circumstances, not possible. On the 
contrary European countries, together with the majority of countries around the world, 
decided that generally the successful party of a lawsuit is able to recover attorneys’ 
fees from the loosing party. This approach is called the ‘English rule’ or the ‘loser 
pays principal’.  
 
On an international level, the question whether art 74 also encompass the recovery of 
attorneys’ fees for the successful claimant arose with the famous decision Zapata 
Hermanos Sucesores SA v Hearthside Baking Co in 2001. The US District Court 
deviated from the American rule and awarded the plaintiff its attorneys’ fees under art 
74. The Court relied on the plain wording of the provision, which suggests that loss 
includes any financial detriment, and that the general aim is for an autonomous and 
uniform interpretation of the CISG.101 However, the US Circuit Court of Appeal 
reversed the judgment. The Court of Appeal named several arguments, which will be 
referred to below, why the recovery of legal expenses is a matter that must be decided 
in accordance with national law and not by art 74. 102 
 
Considering that legal costs in most cases constitute a large part of the overall 
financial loss a party suffers, the question whether the CISG governs legal expenses is 
of utmost importance for all businesses, especially if their case is one decided by an 
American court, and therefore is subject to controversial discussions amongst 
scholars. Three main approaches to this topic can be distinguished. Some scholars 
argue that the recovery of legal costs is a matter excluded from the scope of the 
Convention, because they are best treated as a matter of procedural law.103 Others see 
the legal costs as a part of the damages provision under art 74, but conclude that the 
principle of party equity impedes the availability of these damages under the CISG.104  
  
101  Zapata Hermanos Sucesores, S.A. v. Hearthside Baking Co, 155 F Supp 2d 969, (ED of Illinois 
2001) also available at <www.cisgw3.law.pace.edu>.  
102  Zapata Hermanos Sucesores SA v Hearthside Baking Co, 313 F 3d 385 (7th Cir 2002). 
103  Harry Flechtner and Joseph Lookofsky “Viva Zapata! American Procedure and CISG Substance in 
a U.S. Circuit Court of Appeal” (2003) 7 VJ 93; Alastair Mulis “Twenty-Five Years On – The 
United Kingdom, Damages and the Vienna Sales Convention” (2007) 7 Rabels Zeitschrift für 
ausländisches und internationals Privatrecht 35; Harry M Flechtner “Recovering Attorney’s Fees as 
Damages Under the U.N. Sales Convention (CISG): The Role of Case Law in the New 
International Commercial Practice, with Comments on Zapata Hermanos v Hearthside Baking” 
(2001-2002) 22 Nw J Intl L & Bus 121; Peter Huber and Alastair Mullis The CISG: A new textbook 
for students and practitioners (Sellier European Law Publishers, 2007) at 278. 
104  CISG Advisory Council, above n 6, at [5]; Schwenzer, above n 6, at [29]. 
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A third opinion is that legal expenses are recoverable under art 74 in order to 
guarantee full compensation of the aggrieved party and any possible resulting 
imbalances between plaintiff and defendant are a result of the character of the CISG 
as an imperfect tool of legislation.105 
This paper agrees with the view that attorney costs are best considered as matters of 
procedural law and therefore outside of the CISG’s scope of application. This view is 
even supported by the CISG Advisory Council Opinion on this issue, which in fact is 
better understood as a classification of legal fees as expenses governed by procedural 
law.  
A General Resistance Towards the Distinction Between Procedural and Substantive 
Law  
The argument that legal costs are part of the procedural law in most countries and 
therefore fall outside of the scope of application under the CISG was also made by 
Judge Posner in Zapata. He concluded that “the Convention is about contracts, not 
about procedure” and that the recovery of legal costs is a procedural matter that 
applies in all areas not only in contract law.106 To decide the applicability of the CISG 
on the distinction between procedural and substantive law was heavily criticised by 
scholars. The differences between legal systems regarding the scope of procedural and 
substantive law impair a uniform application and circumvent art 7 (1) which aims for 
an international interpretation.107 Furthermore classic procedural issues under national 
law, for example the burden of proof, are often “so closely connected with the 
application of the substantive provisions that it would be impractical to separate the 
two”;108 hence, the CISG perhaps “inadvertently included procedural issues”.109 What 
applies to the burden of proof may equally apply to the close connection between the 
recovery of legal fees and the substantive law of damages.110 Gotanda, cited by the 
CISG Advisory Council, concludes that “the practice of determining whether an issue 
is governed by applicable procedural law instead of the Convention is outdated, 
counterproductive, and should be abandoned.111 
 
Are these scholars right? The simple answer is: Yes. To base a decision on whether a 
particular matter is governed by the CISG on the distinction between domestic 
  
105  Bruno Zeller, above n 4, at 139–159; Bruno Zeller “Attorney’s Fees – Last Ditch Stand” (2013) 58 
Vil L Rev 761. 
106  Zapata Hermanos Sucesores SA v Hearthside Baking, above n 102, at 388. 
107  Ingeborg Schwenzer and Pascal Hachem “Art 4” in Ingeborg Schwenzer (ed) Commentary on the 
UN Convention on the International Sales of Goods (CISG) (3rd ed, Oxford 2010) at [5]. 
108  Stefan Kröll, cited in Zeller, above n 105, at 765, n 17. 
109  Zeller, above n 105, at 765. 
110  At 765. 
111  Gotanda, above n 4, at 140; CISG Advisory Council, above n 6, at [5.2]. 
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procedural and substantive law undermines the purpose of a uniform interpretation of 
the CISG. However, it is still true that the CISG ‘in principle’ governs the substantive 
law of contract and not procedural issues.112 The CISG has certainly inadvertently 
included procedural issues, for example the necessary level of proof, into the 
substantive contract rules, however, such an inclusion is not necessarily equally 
appropriate for the question of legal fees. An interpretation of art 74 with regard to the 
consequences of an inclusion of legal expenses can still reach the conclusion, that the 
drafters themselves never intended to regulate this issue in the substantive law of 
contract under the CISG, because they classified it as a matter best governed by the 
existing law of procedure.113 In the system of the CISG, one question in art 7 (2) is 
whether the matter is governed at all by the CISG. Even the above-mentioned scholars 
propose a three-step mechanism. First to examine if the matter is governed by the 
plain reading of the CISG provisions, and if not, secondly, if it is deliberately 
excluded, and if not, whether it can be resolved with the principles the CISG is based 
on.114 It is at the second step where legal fees will be evaluated as excluded from the 
scope of the CISG. 
B Was It the Intent of the Drafters to Solve that Issue by Substantive Law? 
1 Plain Wording 
The plain wording of art 74 shows that art 74 does not name any specific losses apart 
from the loss of profit. However, the underlining purpose of art 74, to put the 
aggrieved party in the same position but for the breach, seeks at first sight for the 
inclusion of legal fees under the term loss in art 74. Legal fees pass the simple 
causation test under art 74. Had the other party not breached the contract, the 
aggrieved party would not have had to afford legal advice. Furthermore the breaching 
party could have foreseen legal costs in case of a breach. 
Interestingly Djordjevic argues that legal fees are excluded because they fail the 
causation test.  According to her, the start of court proceedings changes the two 
person contractual relationship into a three person procedural relationship between 
plaintiff, defendant and judge. Legal fees are classified as a result of the litigation 
itself and not necessarily as a result of the breach, because they can exist even if the 
  
112  Stefan Kröll, Loukas Mistelis and Pilar Perales Viscasillas “Introduction to the CISG” in Stefan 
Kröll, Lukas Mistelis and Pilar Perales Viscasillas UN Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (CISG) (Beck, Munich, 2011) at [10]; See also the explicit wording of 
the Preamble “uniform rules which govern contracts”. 
113  See Joseph Lookofsky & Harry Flechtner “Zapata Retold: Attorneys’ Fees Are (Still) not Governed 
by the CISG” (2003) 7 VJ 93. 
114  CISG Advisory Council, above n 6, at [5.3]; Gotanda, above n 4, at 120. 
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court finds that there was no breach of contract.115 However, as Zeller argues, it 
cannot be denied that in cases where a breach exists, the start of court proceedings is a 
result of the breach itself, hence a financial loss caused by the breach.116 Considering 
that the CISG does not call for more than simple causation, Djordjevic’s argument is 
not totally convincing, although the leading thought behind the argument is worth 
keeping in mind. There is a second relationship between the parties that is additional 
to the contractual relationship: The procedural relationship with the beginning of the 
court proceedings.  
2 Drafting History 
The plain wording of art 74 is not exclusively decisive for the question of whether 
loss under art 74 needs to be interpreted to include legal fees. The drafting history 
may still reveal that the drafters did not intend to include this issue under the 
substantive rules on damages. Unfortunately, according to the records of the drafting 
history of the CISG the matter of recovery of legal fees was not addressed at all 
during the negotiation and drafting process.117 Different opinions exist as to what can 
be inferred from that silence. Some conclude that there is a strong assumption that a 
radical change of civil procedural rules would not have happened by omission, 
especially but not exclusively, in countries which follow the American rule. Hence, 
the silence on this matter indicates a lack of intent to include legal fees under art 
74.118 Others are of the opinion that the lack of discussion does not necessarily 
indicate the exclusion of legal fees. First of all because there is no definitive sign that 
the United States of America was not willing to abandon its domestic rule at least in 
an international setting.119 Secondly, it is equally likely that the matter was not 
discussed because it was considered as an obvious part of damages under the CISG.120  
The best approach towards the silence as to the matter of recovery of attorney fees is 
that the fact itself does not support either the inclusion of legal fees under art 74 nor 
  
115  Milena Djordjevic “Art 4” in Stefan Kröll, Lukas Mistelis and Pilar Perales Viscasillas UN 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) (Beck, Munich, 2011) at [43]. 
116  Zeller, above n 105, at 769. 
117  See for a compilation of the drafting and negotiation documents Honnold, above n 8. In none of the 
documents that were relevant for art 74 CISG is the recovery of legal fees ever mentioned. 
118  Flechtner, above 103, at 151 who argues that even jurisdictions with the loser pays rule would have 
carefully considered a replacement of their special designed domestic procedural rules by the rather 
vague provisions of the CISG; and Peter Schlechtriem “Legal Costs as Damages in the Application 
of UN Sales Law” (2006-07) 26 J L & Com 71 at 77; Mulis “Twenty-Five Years On”, above 103, 
at 45. 
119  Milena Djordjevic “Mexican Revolution in CISG Jurisprudence and Case-Law: Attorneys’ Fees as 
(Non)Recoverable Loss for Breach of Contract” in Mirko S. Vasiljevic (ed) Private Law Reform in 
South East Europe: Liber Amicorum Christa Jessel-Holst (Faculty of Law University of Belgrad, 
2010) 199 at 209. 
120  Zeller, above n 4, at 149. 
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the exclusion from the scope of the CISG. If the matter was not discussed both 
aforementioned possibilities exist.  
3 Purpose of Art 74 by Outcome Orientated Approach: No Change to the Equality 
in the Procedural Relationship 
However, the possibility that the matter was not discussed, because it was never 
intended to be part of the substantive contract law is strengthened by an outcome-
oriented analysis.  
 
If legal fees were recoverable under art 74 the plaintiff and the defendant would be 
treated unequal in their procedural relationship. Whereas a successful plaintiff could 
always, including in jurisdictions that follow the American rule, recover its legal fees 
under the CISG, art 74 does not help the successful defendant. Art 74 does not apply 
because there is no breach of contract from the plaintiff. Consequently the successful 
defendant would have to bear its own costs in countries that follow the American 
rule.121 Flechtner and Gotanda pointed out correctly those anomalies, albeit to a lesser 
degree, would also be caused in loser pay jurisdictions. Domestic procedural rules 
often contain a maximum of legally recoverable fees, whereas the CISG does not 
contain such specific limitations apart from the general duty to mitigate loss in art 77. 
An unequal treatment of defendant and plaintiff still seems possible if the domestic 
limitations only apply to the defendant and the uniform interpretation of art 77 is not 
congruent with the domestic rules.122 
It is necessary to note that the equality at issue here is the one existing in the 
procedural relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. In regard to the 
recovery of legal fees the equal treatment of defendant and plaintiff can also be 
explained with a fair risk allocation. In loser pays jurisdictions the possibility to 
recover ones own fees is compensated by the risk to pay the defendant’s costs. In 
jurisdictions with the American rule the impossibility to recover own costs is balanced 
by the absence of a cost risk in regard to defendant’s expenses.  
To abandon the principle of party equity by including legal fees under substantive 
contract law was certainly not intended by loser pay jurisdictions nor by countries 
with the American rule, because both countries treat the parties equal in their own 
system. Scholars who see the issue of legal fees as a matter governed by the CISG as 
  
121 This argument was also mentioned by Judge Posner in Zapata, above n 102, at 389; and is a core 
argument among the scholars who negate that art 74 encompass legal costs; The proposal of John 
Felemegas to construe a duty of loyalty to the contract which is breached by a plaintiff who begins 
court proceedings without proper foundation has been criticised as “result-orientated jurisprudential 
stretch” and has not gained support: See Felemegas’ proposal in John Felemegas “An Interpretation 
of Article 74 CISG by the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals” (2003) 15 Pace Intl L Rev 91 at 126; 
criticised by Flechtner, above n 103, at 152. 
122  Flechtner, above n 103, at 152; Gotanda, above n 4, at 132. 
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well ultimately exclude legal fees due to a violation of party equity.123 However, the 
difference is, those scholars argue with the party equity under the CISG whereas this 
paper argues that it is the party equity in the procedural relationship, not the 
contractual relationship that is decisive. Consequently to retain the party equality in 
the procedural relationship, legal fees were never meant to become part of the 
substantive law of damages under the CISG, but considered as part of the procedural 
law. 
4 CISG Advisory Council Approach is hiding the qualification as procedural 
matter  
The qualification of legal fees as procedural matter and consequently excluded from 
the CISG is also the right interpretation of the CISG Advisory Council approach, even 
if the Advisory Council showed its reluctance to such a distinction.124  
This argument is based on the following:  Once it is accepted that legal fees are part 
of substantive law, because any distinction between substantive and procedural needs 
to be avoided, the CISG Advisory Council argues that the principle of party equity 
apparent in art 45 and 61 hinders an inclusion of legal fees under art 74. 
The problem with this argument is that seen correctly, it is not the principle of party 
equity embodied in the CISG that causes the unequal treatment of defendant and 
plaintiff. Regarding their contractual relationship, and that is what the CISG is 
concerned about, the CISG treats the seller and the buyer exactly the same. In case of 
the breach of contract both have the option to claim damages. What the CISG 
Advisory Council really means is the principle of party equity in the special 
relationship created by the beginning of the proceedings. In other words, the CISG 
Advisory Council first classifies legal fees as a matter of substantive law and hence 
governed by the CISG, in order to then negate the application of art 74 with a 
principle that does not lie in the contractual relationship but is one of procedure after 
the start of proceedings.   
In fact, once it is decided that legal fees are part of substantive contract law the 
solution provided by Zeller would be more consistent. He argues that the recovery of 
legal fees is simply a gap in the CISG and must be decided according to domestic 
laws of procedure. The resulting inequality is a matter of disharmony in procedural 
law and not one of the CISG.125 
C Summary 
It can be concluded that the recovery of legal fees is best considered as a procedural 
matter not governed at all by the CISG. This is because legal fees are costs that are 
  
123  CISG Advisory Council, above n 6, at 5; Schwenzer, above n 6, at [29]. 
124  CISG Advisory Council, above n 6, at [5.2]. 
125  Zeller, above n 105, at 766; with the same arguments to this issue Djordjevic, above 119, at 212. 
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closely linked to the particular equal treatment of parties in their procedural 
relationship rather than in their contractual relationship. This solution is not at odds 
with the fact that certain issues such as the level of proof are considered to be 
governed by the CISG although they are typical matters regulated in national 
procedural law. It is true that a simple test on whether a matter is procedural is not 
satisfying enough to exclude it from the CISG, however, the difference between 
procedural and substantive law exists and each issue needs to be decided separately. 
In the case of the level of proof the matter has been transformed in its entirety into the 
substantive law of the CISG. To include the issue of level of proof into the substantive 
provisions of the CISG does not affect the equal treatment of the parties in their 
procedural relationship and the CISG is able to provide consistent results. To the 
contrary the recovery of legal fees would only be partly shifted into substantive law 
and hence severely violate the basic principle of equity in court proceedings. It is 
acknowledged that a uniform approach to the recovery of legal fees would support 
further harmonisation of international trade and the intent of the drafters would lose 
its weight with the passing of time since, however, the CISG has reached its limits in 
that regard and the issue is one of a possible unification of procedural rules. 
Ultimately even if the CISG does not govern the question of legal fees, the parties are 
always free to provide for a cost allocation rule in their contract. 
 
V Contractual Changes to Art 74: Agreed Sums Payable Upon Breach 
The freedom of parties to shape their contract according to their needs does not only 
concern matters that the CISG does not govern but also any default provisions in the 
CISG that the contracting parties want to modify in parts or exclude. Art 6 embodies 
the essential feature of party autonomy and freedom of contract. This chapter will deal 
with an important modification of the default rule for damages under art 74: The 
inclusion of agreed sums payable upon breach of the contract.  
A Reasons to Include Agreed Sums 
The inclusion of agreed sums payable upon a breach of contract is an often-used 
practice in international commercial sales contracts.   
Firstly, an agreed sum represents a means to secure performance. An example is a 
particular interest in the timely delivery of goods or adherence to a confidentiality 
clause.126 The promisee assumes that the economic pressure of a fixed sum will 
represent an incentive for the promisor to perform its obligations. One may say that 
the agreed sum serves as an insurance against non-performance.  
  
126 Pascal Hachem Agreed Sums Payable upon Breach of an Obligation (Eleven International 
Publishing, Den Haag, 2011) at 45. 
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Secondly, agreed sums serve as a means for compensation, especially when the 
otherwise applicable damages provision does not allow compensation for the 
particular type of damages.127  
Thirdly, even where losses are recoverable under art 74, agreed sums reduce the risk 
and difficulties associated with proving an exact calculation of loss and facilitate the 
litigation process. One example for difficulties in calculation represents the breach of 
a confidentiality clause, where economic loss is suffered, but extremely difficult to 
prove.128  
 
B Agreed Sums Under National Law 
Before this paper addresses the question of whether and to what extent the CISG 
governs agreed sums payable upon breach, a short overview of the treatment in 
national legal systems needs to be given. The importance of the issue of agreed sums 
under the CISG cannot be properly understood without knowing the practical 
consequences for parties of international sales contracts if the matter is governed by 
the applicable national law.  
In fact, the discrepancy existing between common law systems and civil law systems 
regarding the acceptance of agreed sums in contract constitutes a great legal 
uncertainty in cross-border contracts.  
1 Common law systems 
Common law systems divide agreed sums payable upon breach in two categories: 
liquidated damages clauses and penalty clauses. Liquidated damages clauses are 
enforceable, whereas penalty clauses are considered to be unenforceable or invalid. 
This division has its roots in the development of the English law of equity against 
penal bonds in the 15th century. In this time the practice arose to secure the 
performance of a primary obligation by obligating the promisor to issue a bond. 
Under the bond the debtor undertook to pay a fixed amount of money that should 
cease to have effect when the primary obligation had been fulfilled. This practice 
opened the way to abuse of the weaker party as the claim was based on debt and the 
sum under the penal bond was often much higher than the value of the contract. 
Equity courts granted relief from the penal bond in cases where the bond was intended 
to serve as a security for monetary damages and the debtor was willing to pay those 
actual damages plus interest.129  
  
127  At 47; Under art 74 this may apply to the recovery of litigation costs (to this current issue see above 
IV). 
128  At 49. 
129  An excellent overview of the history of the penalty clauses in English Law is given in Cavendish 
Square Holding BV v Talal El Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67 at [3]–[9]. 
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As a consequence of the decisions in equity common law courts developed the 
distinction between penalty clauses and liquidated damages clauses in the context of 
agreed sums payable upon breach of contract. The decisive test is the pre-estimate of 
loss rule developed in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage & Motor Co 
Ltd.130 Lord Dunedin stated that a sum amounts to be a penalty clause if the “sum is 
extravagant and unconscionable in comparison to the greatest loss that could 
conceivably be proved to have followed from the breach”.131 The pre-estimate of loss 
test led to the formula that penalty clauses serve as a punishment in order to compel 
performance, whereas liquidated damages clauses operate as a means for 
compensation.132 
The application of the pre-estimate of loss test has proven to be difficult and has led to 
highly unpredictable decisions for parties. The penalty clause rule has been subject to 
extensive criticism by courts and scholars who argue that the rule is ‘anachronism’, 
the underlining rationale is not clear and especially not suitable in the commercial 
context where an interference with freedom of contract should be avoided.133  
2 Civil Law systems 
Civil law systems consider sums payable upon breach generally enforceable 
irrespective of their function. The system was influenced by Roman Law where the 
‘stipulatio poneae’ was seen as an efficient way to encourage performance and to 
facilitate recovery of losses, particularly to avoid difficulties inherent in the 
assessment and proof of damages after a breach of contract.134 Nevertheless, as 
Roman Law already acknowledged the need of a certain upper limit to agreed sums, 
most civil law countries as well as mixed jurisdictions allow the reduction of the sums 
by the arbitrator or judge in cases where the agreed sum is excessive. However, when 
determining what constitutes an excessive sum a high threshold has to be met to allow 
the court to interfere with the parties’ autonomy.135  
  
130  Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage & Motor Co Ltd [1914] UKHL 1: This test is also 
basis for decisions in Australia, Bhutan, Ireland and New Zealand; In the United States of America 
an essentially identical test has been established in Banta v Stamford Motor Co. Sup Ct Er Conn, 21 
December 1914, 92 A 665 (Conn 1914). 
131 At 87. 
132  See references to this common approach in all common law countries in Hachem, above 126, at 63. 
133 At 85, n 218 for an overview of the current criticism in common Law jurisdictions towards the 
Penalty Rule. 
134  At 29. 
135 Some jurisdictions, for example Latvia (Art 1721 CC) and Japan (Art 420 (1) sentence 2 Civil 
Code), exclude the possibility of reduction for Courts; others do not foresee the possibility of 
reduction when the agreed sum is included in commercial contracts between merchants (see 
German Law s 348 Commercial Code which excludes the application of the possibility for 
reduction stated in s 343 Civil Code).  
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C Agreed Sums Under the CISG 
On an international level the CISG does not deal explicitly with agreed sums in case 
of a breach of contract. Whereas it is undisputed that the formation of such clauses is 
governed by the applicable CISG rules, it has recently been discussed whether the 
validity of such clauses is a matter excluded by the CISG under art 4 (a), and thus the 
traditional approach prevails; or if art 4 cannot be invoked because the issue of agreed 
sums is a remedy governed in its entirety by the principle of compensation in 
combination with the principle of party autonomy.136  
Having seen the different approaches in national laws, it is obvious, that a uniform 
approach under the CISG would enhance legal certainty in trade. In cases where the 
law of conflict follows the common law rule, parties currently risk their agreed sum 
being declared invalid. This consequence undermines the aim of the parties to 
facilitate the litigation process and peculiarities of the applicable law of damages. 
The following analysis aims at contrasting and evaluating the current positions in the 
literature and concludes that the agreed sums should be governed in its entirety by the 
CISG.  
1 Question of validity 
Art 4 in the CISG states that the CISG is not concerned with the validity of the 
contract or any of its provisions. Keeping in mind the international character of the 
CISG and its’ aim for a uniform interpretation, the term validity needs to be 
interpreted autonomously irrespective of the ‘label’ of the national rule.137 Hence, the 
mere fact that the common law jurisdiction declares penalty clauses invalid or void is 
not sufficient. Rather the function of the rules governing agreed sums in national law 
is the decisive factor. Hachem concludes that all rules regarding agreed sums in 
national jurisdictions share a common function: They are a protection mechanism by 
reducing the agreed sum or by declaring the provision invalid.138 Hachem’s view 
deserves support regarding the qualification as a matter of validity. Both jurisdictions 
saw the need to set a limit to party autonomy and negate the legal effect of such 
clauses to a certain degree. However, it is argued the conclusion that Hachem draws 
from that fact is a step to far, which will be elaborated in the next paragraph. 
 
  
136  Jack Graves “Penalty Clauses and the CISG” (2012) 30 JL & Com 153 where he follows the 
traditional approach that national law applies to the question of the validity of such a clause; but 
Bruno Zeller “When is a Fixed Sum Not a Fixed Sum but a Penalty Clause“ (2012) 30 JL & Com 
173 and Bruno Zeller “Penalty Clauses: Are they governed by the CISG“ (2011) 23 Pace Intl 
L Rev 1 arguing that the CISG governs agreed sums in its entirety. 
137  Schwenzer and Hachem, above n 107, at [31]. 
138  Hachem, above n 126, at 169. 
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2 Equivalent solution within the CISG 
Even if one comes to the result that agreed sums trigger questions of validity, the 
exception of art 4 (a) does not automatically apply. Resorting to national law is 
precluded by art 4 (a), the second sentence reads “except as otherwise expressly or 
provided in this provision”. Agreed sums are not expressly mentioned in the CISG, 
but this exception has to be understood in a broad matter and includes that the 
Convention provides implicitly an answer within its four corners. The exception is a 
gateway for the gap-filling procedure under art 7 (2).  
 
Hachem does not find a solution within the four corner of the CISG. According to him 
the CISG does not contain any protection mechanisms for the debtor.139 Thus he 
ultimately concludes that agreed sums are excluded from the CISG and national law 
applies, but – from a systematic point of view not without controversy – the national 
question of validity needs to be answered against the backdrop of art 7 (1).140 
 
Whether the CISG does not contain any protection mechanisms will be discussed at a 
later point, but the primary criticism of Hachem’s approach is that Hachem applies the 
second step before the first. The first question should be whether, and maybe, to what 
extent the CISG governs agreed sums. At this stage the question of the protection of 
the debtor is not relevant yet. Once decided whether the CISG governs the matter of 
agreed sums payable upon breach (not any protection mechanism related to them in 
national law) the second step must be to examine whether the CISG contains a 
protection mechanism and eventually when it should apply.  
 
Therefore, irrespective of the national approach to agreed sums payable upon breach 
of contract, it has to be evaluated whether general principles within the four corners of 
the CISG govern the matter of agreed sums.  
a. Art 74 and Art 6 
As an advocate for a solution within the general principles of the CISG Zeller argues 
that the principle of full compensation in conjunction with the principle of party 
autonomy provide a ‘functional equivalent’ solution. He concludes that agreed sums 
should be seen as a “predetermined amount of damages payable in cases of a breach 
  
139  At 169. 
140 At 170. Hachem’s solution was adopted by the CISG Advisory Council CISG Advisory Council 
“Opinion 10: Agreed Sums Payable upon Breach of an Obligation in CISG Contracts” 
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu>. See for criticism of this solution: Graves, above n 136, at 159 who 
argues that Hachem’s solution is doubtful because, once excluded from the CISG, it is not easy to 
understand why the interpretation of national law needs to follow an international standard under 7 
(1). Moreover because 7 (1) usually is applied to internal gaps of the CISG, not to external gaps.  
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of contract” irrespective of the question if the amount exceeds actual damages. Art 6 
replaces the first part of art 74 whereas the rule of foreseeability still applies.141 On 
the contrary Graves argues that the foreseeability rule does not “provide a fully 
sufficient independent basis for enforcing anything” and that the parties’ autonomy 
under art 6 is always subject to the validity check under art 4.142  
b. How strong is the principle of party autonomy? 
The right answer has to be found somewhere in the middle. Art 6 allows parties to 
modify the effect of any of the provisions under the CISG. The question is; does any 
exercise of party autonomy become an issue of validity to be analysed under domestic 
law?143  
 
As long as the parties’ derogation stays in the corners of the principle of full 
compensation there should be no recourse to art 4. However, to stay in the boundaries 
of the principle of full compensation does not necessarily mean that an amount that 
exceeds the actual loss otherwise recoverable under art 74 automatically falls out of 
the principle of full compensation. A clause that is qualified as a penalty clause under 
Common Law may still fall under art 74. 
 
It is at this point where the analysis of the first part of this paper (above III B) 
provides useful guidance. The point of reference for any damages claim should be the 
right to performance under the contract: Compensation as a substitute for the interest 
in performance. It is exactly the same motivation that drives parties to the inclusion of 
an agreed sum. They agree on an amount of money in the case of non-performance. 
Or in other words, they place a value on the interest in performance. That value may 
exceed the actual monetary loss, but both parties agree prior to the breach that the 
amount is an appropriate substitute for the non-performance.   
 
Therefore it is the different point of reference that may lead to the fact that an agreed 
sum that is a penalty clause under common law still falls under the principle of full 
compensation in art 74. It is not a question of a pre-estimate of actual loss but of the 
interest in performance. Interestingly the recent decision of the High Court in England 
Cavendish Square Holding BV v Talal El Makdessi argued that the penalty rule in 
common law is also rooted in the legitimate interest in performance of the obligation 
in question, but unfortunately, an “over-literal reading” of the Dunlop decision, 
  
141  Zeller “When is a Fixed Sum Not a Fixed Sum but a Penalty Clause“, above n 136, at 184. 
142  Graves, above n 136, at 162. 
143 Phanesh Koneru “The International Interpretation of the UN Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods: An Approach Based on General Principles” (1997) 6 Minn J Global 
Trade 105 at 145. 
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caused development towards an “artificial categorization, itself the result of 
unsatisfactory distinctions: between a penalty and genuine pre-estimate of loss”.144 
Ultimately the Court concludes that 
  
the true test [to decide whether a clause is a penalty clause] is whether the 
impugned provision is a secondary obligation which imposes a detriment on the 
contract breaker out of all proportion to any legitimate interest to the innocent 
party in enforcement of the primary obligation.145 
 
Furthermore the Court acknowledged that in commercial contracts there is a „strong 
initial presumption” that “the parties themselves are the best judges of what is 
legitimate in a provision dealing with the consequences of a breach”.146 
Time will show whether this decision is the first step towards an abolishment of the 
penalty rule. In any case the judgment reveals that the proposed international 
approach is not at odds with the roots of the penalty clause rule. 
c. Agreed sums with a punitive character 
The borderline where parties are no longer in the scope of full compensation is 
reached where the agreed sum has a punitive character. The CISG does not cover 
punitive damages and therefore a resort to national law, from a dogmatic point of 
view, is the right answer.147 Art 6 is at this point subject to the validity check under 
national law. Zeller also seems to acknowledge this limit of the scope of the CISG in 
his reply to Graves’ criticism towards his new approach.148 However, he relies on the 
“overwhelming” weight of the principle of party autonomy and the aim of uniformity.  
 
This paper agrees with Zeller´s approach, that, although art 6 would trigger art 4 in 
cases of agreed sums with a punitive character, the preferred answer is that the CISG 
governs all agreed sums irrespective of their function.149 Firstly, a punitive character 
would still need to be evaluated under the principles of the CISG. The mere function 
of providing an incentive to perform would therefore never be sufficient. Rather the 
agreed sum has to be examined as to whether it is extensively exceeding any 
legitimate interest in performance and therefore serves as a punishment. However, in 
  
144  At [31]. 
145  At [32] 
146  At [35]. 
147  Taking this approach Michael Bridge The International Sale of Goods: Law and Practice (Oxford 
University Press, 2007) at 11.38 as cited in Pilar Perales Viscasillas “Art 7” in in Stefan Kröll, 
Lukas Mistelis and Pilar Perales Viscasillas UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale 
of Goods (CISG) (Beck, Munich, 2011) at [55], n 123. 
148  Zeller “When is a Fixed Sum Not a Fixed Sum but a Penalty Clause”, above n 136, at 182. 
149  Perales Viscasillas, above n 147, at [55], n 123. 
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commercial contracts such clauses will be rare. For example, any agreed sum, 
irrespective of the amount, will usually find its way into the calculation of the sales 
price. The fair balance of risks in the contract persists and parties themselves agree on 
the value of performance.  
 
A real penal character will require an existing unequal bargaining power. In the rare 
cases where exceptional circumstances hint towards an unequal bargaining situation, 
it is proposed to solve this issue with a reduction of the sum pursuant to the principle 
of good faith under art 7. There is a consensus that the principle of good faith, 
irrespective of the initial intention of the drafters, should not only play a role for the 
interpretation of the CISG itself, but should also constitute a standard for the 
relationship of the contracting parties.150 The question of when an agreed sum is not 
justified in relation to the contractual duty is after all a question of reasonableness. 
Even if the parties are businessmen, a fair dealing requires that one party does not 
abuse its bargaining power excessively without any justification. 
The same considerations are reflected in art 7.4.13 (2) of the UNIDROIT Principles, 
which consider agreed sums valid but provide for the reduction “to a reasonable 
amount where it is grossly excessive in relation to the harm resulting from the non-
performance and to the other circumstances.” The reference to ‘other circumstances’ 
demonstrates that actual harm is not the decisive point of reference. Hence, a solution 
with the help of the principle of good faith would also bring the CISG in line with 
other international instruments. 
D Summary 
The analysis of the issue of agreed sums payable upon breach has shown that it is 
important to resist any qualification of agreed sums under national law. Such pre-
categorization always embodies the risk that an international interpretation is 
influenced by national legal perceptions. Agreed sums payable upon breach are 
definitely governed by the CISG itself and not by national law as long as they serve a 
compensatory character and not a punitive character. The compensatory character 
needs to be evaluated with reference to the performance interest in the contract, which 
leaves very little scope for a punitive character in business relationships. Ultimately in 
cases where a court determines a punitive character, the solution should be a reduction 
pursuant to art 7 CISG, despite the fact that from a dogmatic view, a resort to national 
law would be the right answer in these cases. A reduction mechanism would preclude 
  
150  See Perales Viscasillas, above n 147, at [25]–[28] who also points at the development in case law; 
contrary Schwenzer and Hachem, above n 88, at [17] who argue that art 7 “cannot be applied 
directly to individual contracts” but at least might influence indirectly the relationship via the 
interpretation of the provisions of the CISG. 
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an artificial division of agreed sums and would be in line with other existing 
international commercial law instruments. 
 
VI Final Conclusion 
This paper has discussed three current issues related to the law of damages under the 
CISG. As an overall result the analysis has shown opportunities for further 
development but has also pointed out limits of the CISG.  
In regard to the still little discussed question of disgorgement of profit under the 
CISG, it is one of the biggest advantages of the law of damages under the CISG that it 
can be developed through the interpretative provision of art 7. This chance should be 
taken and the CISG should not hesitate to provide such a solution in order to provide 
an effective remedy in cases where damages based on economic loss are not 
appropriate. Certainly, such a development must take place with the appropriate 
caution but the CISG has the chance to further observe the international trend and 
elaborate a uniform solution for the availability of disgorgement in contract law. 
Likewise, it would be an important step towards the aim of removal of legal barriers if 
courts deal with agreed sums, regardless of their national classification, exclusively 
under the Convention. However, the CISG reaches its limits in regard to the recovery 
of legal fees occurred during litigation. Art 74 is not able to maintain the equity of the 
parties in their procedural relationship. Hence, the parties are best advised to agree on 
a cost-allocation rule in their contract. 
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